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Prevention of harm, distribution (compensation, risk allocation, or redistribution of 
income) and controlling administrative costs are the generally accepted goals of the 
civil  justice  system.  Is  optimal  cooperation,  defined  in  this  paper  as  using  the 
problem-solving method of negotiation, a valuable fourth goal? If the legal system 
can  successfully  support  problem-solving  negotiations,  without  endangering  other 
objectives, this is likely to lead to creation of value in terms of the preferences of the 
parties, to reductions in the costs of dispute resolution, and probably also to lower 
costs of transacting. Thus, optimal cooperation in the problem-solving manner seems 
to be a goal that is consistent with the perspective of welfare economics, in which the 
well-being of individuals is the criterion for normative evaluation.  
The net benefits of accepting this objective will depend on how the legal system can 
actually  support  problem-solving.  This  article  discusses  seven  possible  areas  of 
implementation. A legal system attuned to problem-solving will be more open towards 
different  types  of  interests  and  will  stimulate  the  parties  to  find  creative  value-
maximizing  solutions.  The  perspective  of  problem-solving  underlines  the  need  to 
improve  access  to  court,  and  more  in  general  to  reduce  bargaining  ranges  by 
enhancing the way the legal system provides ‘batnas’. If this is done, distribution of 
value  will become easier  and the effects  of bargaining power can be diminished. 
Stressing  the  use  of  objective  criteria,  the  perspective  contains  an  invitation  to 
redesign  the  rules  of  substantive  private  law  so  that  they  give  better  help  to  the 
negotiating parties when they deal with distributive issues. Useful objective criteria 
for distributive issues may be continuous instead of binary. Multiple objective criteria 
can exist next to each other. They do not have to be binding, but can be adjustable to 
individual differences in valuation of interests, different ways of creating value, and 
dissimilar external circumstances. The perspective of problem-solving also invites us 
to rethink the processes of contracting and dispute resolution, the role of blaming, 
and the principle of autonomy. Although many of the proposals suggested by this 
perspective are not new, it may help to develop a more coherent vision on reform of 
the civil justice system.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cooperation
2 is essential for markets and societies. During the second half of the last 
century, much knowledge has been developed and put into action regarding the way 
people can interact to optimize their cooperation. But how is this reflected in the legal 
institutions  that  support  markets  and  society  at  large?  Certainly,  the  legal  system 
provides  a  framework  for  cooperation.  Legal  institutions  define  property  rights, 
provide for enforcement of contracts, sanction behavior that unreasonably interferes 
with other people’s interests, and set out procedures for disputes regarding property 
rights and liabilities. The way people cooperate within this framework, however, is 
left to them. Moreover, the framework provided by the legal system sometimes seems 
to discourage cooperation, in particular where it invites people having differences to 
retreat in legal positions. Thus, value that can be created through cooperation may be 
left on the bargaining table, and unnecessary transaction costs may arise. The question 
addressed in this study is whether the rules and practices of the law of contracts, the 
law of torts, and the law regarding dispute resolution, can be redesigned so that they 
give better support to cooperation.  
A.  Cooperation Through Problem-Solving 
Cooperation can come in many forms, but without some idea of what it entails, it can 
hardly  serve  as  a  guiding  principle.  Therefore,  I  use  the  well-defined  method  of 
‘problem-solving’ negotiation as a proxy for optimal cooperation. Throughout this 
article, this generic term will be used for interest-based and cooperative negotiation 
methods  that  are  also  known  as  ‘principled,’  ‘integrative,’  ‘cooperative,’  ‘ 
                                                 
2 In this study, I use ‘cooperation’ in the sense of coordinated action between individuals in a way that 
optimally benefits both. Although some connotations with ‘soft’ or ‘willing to concede’ may arise, it is 
hard to find a better general term. The term ‘problem-solving’ is reserved for a particular method of 
cooperation developed in Negotiation Theory, see the next note.    5 
collaborative,’  or  (less  adequately)  ‘win-win’  approaches  to  negotiation.
3  The 
problem-solving  method  not  only  gives  us  a  clear  picture  of  what  can  constitute 
optimal cooperation, it can also be used to assess in which situations cooperation is 
desirable at all. The concept of a ‘batna’, which will be explained in due course, 
reflects that cooperation is not always the best option. The basic message behind this 
concept is that a person should not cooperate with a certain other person if he has an 
alternative that better serves his interests.  
The literature on negotiation generally distinguishes two types of bargaining. The first 
type is distributive bargaining, also called competitive or win-lose bargaining.
4 In this 
type of bargaining, the parties want to maximize their share in resources that are seen 
as fixed and limited. Both parties have resistance points, reservation prices that are 
their  minimally  acceptable  outcomes,  usually  because  they  have  alternatives  to 
agreement  that  are  more  attractive  to  them:  their  batnas  (best  alternative  to 
agreement).  The  spread  between  these  two  points  is  their  bargaining  range  or 
settlement range, and the goal of the negotiations is to get a maximum share of this 
zone of possible agreement.
5 Distributive bargaining often takes the form of arguing 
over positions, and when the parties agree, it is by making concessions from their 
initial  positions.  It  is  a  form  of  bargaining  that  is  familiar  from  such  simple 
transactions as the sale of a house. The parties haggle over the price, trying to get the 
                                                 
3  The  method  of  problem-solving  or  integrative  negotiations  is  developed  in  the  literature  on 
negotiation,  see  Roy  J.  Lewicki,  David  M.  Saunders  and  John  W.  Minton,  Negotiation  (3rd  ed., 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill,  Boston,  1999)  108.  (mentioning  as  distinguishing  elements:  a  focus  on 
commonalities  rather  than  differences,  an  attempt  to  address  needs  and  interests,  not  positions;  a 
commitment to meeting the needs of all involved parties; an exchange of information and ideas; the 
invention  of  options  for  mutual  gain;  the  use  of  objective  criteria  for  standards  of  performance). 
Contributions to its development came from R.E. Walton and R.B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of 
Labor Negotiations (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965), D.G. Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior (Academic 
Press, New York, 1981) and the method was brought to the attention of the general public by R. Fisher, 
W.Ury and B.Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving in (2nd ed., 1991), who 
added the use of objective criteria and stressed this by coining their version: ‘principled negotiations’. 
Although I think this is a major enrichment of the method, see Chris Guthrie, ' Review Essay: Using 
Bargaining for Advantage in Law School Negotiation Courses: Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation 
Strategies for Reasonable People. By G. Richard Shell'  (2000) 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resolution 219, 
and one on which I focus in this article, I prefer the term problem-solving negotiations because it is 
more  commonly  used,  and  it  avoids  the  connotation  with  people  not  willing  to  move  from  their 
positions because ‘principles’ are involved. Problem-solving is increasingly promoted for use in legal 
disputes, see Carry Menkel-Meadow, ' Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of 
Problem  Solving'   (1984)  31  UCLA  Law  Review  754,  Carry  Menkel-Meadow,  ' Aha?  Is  Creativity 
Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal Education?'  (2001) 6 Harvard Negotiation 
Law Review 97 and Robert H. Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet and Andrew S. Tulumello, Beyond winning : 
negotiating  to  create  value  in  deals  and  disputes  (Belknap  Press  of  Harvard  University  Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 2000) 6 and 173-271. See for a history of the idea of problem-solving in the setting 
of  resolution  of  (legal)  disputes  Carry  Menkel-Meadow,  ' Mothers  and  Fathers  of  Invention:  The 
Intellectual Founders of ADR'  (2000) 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resolution 1, 16. 
4 See Roy J. Lewicki, David M. Saunders and John W. Minton, Negotiation (3rd ed., Irwin/McGraw-
Hill, Boston, 1999). 
5 Howard Raiffa, John Richardson and David Metcalfe, Negotiation Analysis; The Science and Art of 
Collaborative Decision Making (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 
2003) 109-115.   6 
best share of the bargaining range, knowing they can step out of the negotiations and 
look for another buyer or for a seller of a similar house. It is also often used in the 
setting of litigation. The parties try to predict how the court will rule in their case and 
what  the  costs  of  going  to  court  will  be  because  a  court  action  is  their  batna  to 
accepting the settlement being offered by the other party.  
Problem-solving  negotiations  follow  a  different  pattern.
6  In  this  method,  the 
underlying interests of the parties are the building blocks, which need to be uncovered 
by intensive communication. The parties then jointly develop solutions that best serve 
these interests. Thus, the resources available to the negotiating parties in order to 
solve the problem are expanded. When it comes to dividing the resources, each party 
tries to establish its batna and that of the other party. In this, it is similar to distributive 
bargaining. The dividing of the settlement range, however, takes place on the basis of 
objective criteria, such as market prices, generally accepted norms, or legal rules.   
How could the legal system promote the problem-solving method? Take two partners 
in a business each serving some important customers. Assume they want to split up 
because of personal differences that surfaced when they discussed some bad outcomes 
in past deals. Most legal systems now invite them to see these adverse outcomes as 
the consequences of wrongful behavior by the other party for which this other party is 
liable. The business has to be split up in accordance with the terms of the contract, 
which may or may not include a good procedure for this contingency. Discussions of 
these  topics  will  tend  to  be confrontational,  are  likely  to  be  formal and  probably 
costly. In the meantime, the parties  will  probably  try to  find a practical  solution, 
usually by determining a settlement amount to be paid to one party in return for that 
party’s willingness to give up control over the business.  
Contrast this to a setting that stimulates the partners to discuss their differences in 
terms  of  their  interests,  not  unlike  the  rules  for  divorce,  which  have  in  the  legal 
systems  of  most  countries  moved  away  from  assigning  fault,  first  as  an  access 
criterion  for  divorce  proceedings,  and  now  increasingly  also  as  a  criterion  for 
determining consequences like child custody, child support and maintenance for the 
spouse. The default rules of our improved legal system would invite the parties to 
identify  solutions  that maximally  serve  their  interests.  They  would  also suggest a 
menu  of  objective  criteria  for  compensation  and  other  distributive  issues:  various 
valuing principles for assets and formulas for calculating compensation for lost future 
opportunities to the partner that has to leave the business, for instance. Contracts in 
our  imaginary  legal  world  tend  to  build  on  these  defaults,  and  tailor  them  to  the 
specific circumstances by giving more concrete compensation criteria for the options 
                                                 
6 See for the key  steps identified in the literature R.  Fisher, W.Ury and B.Patton, Getting to Yes: 
Negotiating an Agreement without Giving in (2nd ed., 1991) (separate the people from the problem; 
focus on interests, not positions; invent options for mutual gain; insist on using objective criteria), Roy 
J. Lewicki, David M. Saunders and John W. Minton, Negotiation (3rd ed., Irwin/McGraw-Hill, Boston, 
1999) 122-128. (identify and define the problem; understand the problem fully; identify interests and 
needs; generate alternative solutions; evaluation and selection of alternatives), and for a more formal 
analysis Howard Raiffa, John Richardson and David Metcalfe, Negotiation Analysis; The Science and 
Art of Collaborative Decision Making (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 2003) 190-309.    7 
of splitting up the business and of a sale of the share of one of the partners to the 
other.  
The default rule for dispute resolution starts with a code of conduct with do’s and 
don’ts regarding communication about differences, stimulating discussion of interests 
and emotional issues. The code gives the parties criteria to assess whether they are 
doing well in their settlement discussions or whether they might need the assistance of 
a  mediator  or  lawyer  versed  in  problem-solving.  The  contract  again  gives  more 
specific information, like names of the people they might ask for help.  
If  the  parties  do  not  succeed  in  reaching  agreement,  the  default  provides  for  the 
remaining distributive issues to be laid down in a document that will be the basis for a 
court decision on the issues. In making its decisions, the court will apply the same 
objective criteria, according to a procedure to be determined together with the parties 
and tailored to their procedural needs and their resources. When different criteria lead 
to different outcomes, which they usually do, the court does not choose one criterion 
but looks for the middle ground, for instance by giving appropriate weights to all 
criteria.  
The emotions and interests underlying complaints about the conduct of the other party 
in the past have a central place in the proceedings, but wrongful conduct, causation, 
and damage are not the prime criteria for dealing with distributive issues. If there is a 
suspicion or allegation of fraud, the communication and dispute resolution rules may 
provide for a different track, maybe stipulating a discussion between the parties under 
the supervision of a neutral party, which can be the first step towards discovery and 
more formal accusations. 
What  this  suggests  is  that  the  legal  system  is  not  by  its  nature  positional  and 
adversarial,  but  surprisingly  capable  of  supporting  different  styles  of  negotiation. 
Moreover, it can change over time in the direction of supporting more cooperative 
models  of  solving  differences;  not  so  long  ago,  most  divorces  were  costly  and 
emotionally  stressful  blaming  battles.  The  central  question  this  article  raises  is 
whether such change towards supporting co-operation is desirable and possible for at 
least some situations the legal system has to cope with.   
B.  What Follows 
Part II explains why stimulating cooperation in the form of encouraging negotiating 
parties to use the  problem-solving  method  may  be a worthwhile goal for the law 
regarding  private  relations.  This  method  invites  the  parties  to  create  value,  thus 
leading to welfare gains, and to distribute value fairly in accordance with objective 
criteria. In many situations problem-solving negotiations will also be less costly than 
distributive  negotiations,  so  that  transaction  costs  may  decrease.  Supporting 
cooperation does not seem to conflict with the existing goals of private law, although 
it is too early for an assessment of the costs and benefits of adding problem-solving as 
a goal for the legal system.  
Part  III  explores  which  elements  of  private  law  are  already  consistent  with  the 
problem-solving method, which private law rules and practices conflict with it, and 
how these rules and practices could be brought in line with this mode of cooperation. 
Problem-solving is described in terms of seven key elements, five of which can be   8 
phrased for ease of reference in the terms made famous by ‘Getting to Yes’: ‘Focus on 
interests, not on positions; Invent options for mutual gain; Develop your batna; Insist 
on using objective criteria; Separate the people from the problem.’
7 Two additional 
elements  have  always  been  part  of  the  integrative  method,  but  deserve  somewhat 
more attention in this article as they seem so different from what the legal system 
prescribes.  In  an  attempt  to  create  two  more  one-liners:  ‘Avoid  blame,  look  for 
contribution.’; ‘Be cooperative, and do not overestimate your autonomy.’   
In the concluding section, Part IV, the results are summarized and a lists of topics for 
further research is presented, indicating what the goal of problem-solving would mean 
for contract law, tort law and law regarding dispute resolution, and hinting at some 
implications for other areas of the legal system. The conclusion is that the theory of 
problem-solving may be a useful guiding principle for reform of the legal system.       
C.  Prior Research 
Using the theory of integrative negotiations for an evaluation of the legal system is an 
approach  that  can  be  related  to  several  strands  of  existing  research.  Negotiation 
Theory covers two rather important aspects of human cooperation: deal-making and 
resolution  of  conflicts.
8  The  models  Negotiation  Theory  provides  are  partly 
descriptive, and many theorists also offer prescriptive advice, but mainly to individual 
negotiators.  Some  studies  have  embarked  upon  the  design  of  dispute  resolution 
systems.
9 This literature is still in its early stages, however, and mostly deals with 
dispute resolution inside organizations, or in some particular outside relations, such as 
relations with customers. This study extends this line of research, by taking the legal 
system as an example of a dispute resolution system that can be redesigned.
10 Until 
now, most negotiation theorists accept the legal system as it is. They take for granted 
that the legal system supplies certain alternatives to agreement (batnas) in the form of 
the  outcome  of  court  proceedings.  They  then  supply  methods  for  optimally 
negotiating within this legal framework. Although they point out the impact of the 
legal environment on the processes and outcomes of negotiations,
11 and of the major 
                                                 
7 R. Fisher, W.Ury and B.Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving in (2nd ed., 
1991) 
8 See for excellent overviews of the state of the art Roy J. Lewicki, David M. Saunders and John W. 
Minton, Negotiation (3rd ed., Irwin/McGraw-Hill, Boston, 1999) and Howard Raiffa, John Richardson 
and David Metcalfe, Negotiation Analysis; The Science and Art of Collaborative Decision Making (The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2003). 
9 William L. Ury, Jeanne M. Brett and Stephen B. Goldberg (Author), Getting Disputes Resolved: 
Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict (Jossey-Bass, 1988), Cathy A. Costantino and Christina 
Sickles  Merchant,  Designing  Conflict  Management  Systems:  A  Guide  to  Creating  Productive  and 
Healthy Organizations (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1996) and John P. Conbere, ’Theory Building for 
Conflict Management System Design’ (2001) 19 Conflict Resolution Quarterly 215. 
10 See also John Lande, ’Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in 
Court-Connected  Mediation  Programs’  (2002)  50  UCLA  Law  Review  69  (applying  such  design 
principles to court-annexed mediation programs). 
11 R. H. Mnookin and L. Kornhauser, ’Bargaining in the Shadow of the law: The Case of Divorce’ 
(1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 950.   9 
consequences of changes in this environment,
12 they are hesitant to suggest changes in 
legal rules that might improve the way differences are negotiated.
13 This is also the 
approach  of  mediation and  ADR  theorists,  who  tend  to  think in  terms  of finding 
alternatives to legal processes rather than improving them. Building on research in 
social  psychology  and  techniques  developed  for  the  helping  professions,  they 
developed what I will call the ‘technology’ of dispute resolution.
14 This paper explores 
whether it is feasible and desirable to integrate this technology in the legal system, for 
instance in the rules and practices of civil procedure.
15 
Legal scholars long had a blind spot for negotiation processes. They focused on the 
procedural  rules  and  the  substantive  law  determining  the  judgments  of  courts.  In 
recent years, however, negotiation processes ‘in the shadow of the law’ attracted more 
attention.  Practicing  lawyers  feel  the  pressures  from  the  outside  to  improve 
negotiation  processes,  and  the  use  of  problem-solving  methods  by  lawyers  is 
promoted  extensively.
16  Research  is  developing  that  shows  that  some  legal  rules 
provide a better environment for mediation and problem-solving negotiations than 
others.
17 This naturally leads to the question posed in this article: ‘How could the legal 
system be adjusted to promote cooperation, and problem-solving in particular?’ 
This  study  builds  in  many  respects  on  the  teachings  of  Law  and  Economics. 
Economists, and in particular game theorists, study the way cooperation will evolve if 
the individuals sitting at both ends of the bargaining table can obtain better outcomes 
by cooperating.
18 They mainly concentrate their efforts on finding design principles for 
contracts  that  cope  with  moral  hazard,  private  information  and  unforeseen 
circumstances, however.
19 In this literature, the legal system is mainly seen as a tool to 
enforce  obligations.  Sometimes  non-legal  sanctions  are  included  as  well  in  the 
analysis,  like  reputation,  hostage-taking,  refusals  to  deal,  or  instruments  making 
                                                 
12 E. E. Maccoby and R. H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992). 
13 The best example of how far this line of thinking can be extended is arguably Robert H. Mnookin, 
Scott R. Peppet and Andrew S. Tulumello, Beyond winning : negotiating to create value in deals and 
disputes (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000).  
14 See Chapter III.E. 
15 Carry Menkel-Meadow, ’Toward Another View  of Legal Negotiation:  The  Structure  of Problem 
Solving’ (1984) 31 UCLA Law Review 754, Carry Menkel-Meadow, ’The Trouble with the Adversary 
System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World’ (1996) 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5 and Robert A. Baruch 
Bush, ’Alternative Futures: Imagining How ADR May Affect the Court System in Coming Decades’ 
(1996) 15 The Review of Litigation 455, 461. are  just some of the earlier explorations in this direction.  
16 See supra note ===. 
17 See Ray D. Madoff, ’Lurking in the Shadow: The Unseen Hand of Doctrine in Dispute Resolution’ 
(2002) 76 Southern California Law Review 161. 
18 See the ground-breaking work of Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New 
York, 1984) and further developments in what now is called ‘cooperation theory’ as decribed in Robert 
Axelrod, ' On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory'  (2000) Analyse & Kritik 130. 
19 See for an overview of this research Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization and 
Management (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1992).   10 
contracts self-enforcing.
20 This article suggests to include the process of cooperation 
itself into the area of enquiry, and to explore how cooperation could be optimized by 
fine-tuning the legal system.
21 In Law and Economics writings there is little as yet 
about the processes by which parties can create value, and the building of mechanisms 
that could help them to do this in a better way.
22  
Although the approach suggested in this article is not dependent on the framework of 
Welfare Economics, it is consistent with it where the increase of the well-being of 
individuals can be used as a yardstick for its plausibility.
23 The underlying belief is 
that we may be able to increase the well-being of individuals by fine-tuning legal 
rules and other institutions so that they stimulate individuals to cooperate effectively.    
In the future, Behavioral Law and Economics might provide a theoretical framework 
for investigating the way the legal system can support negotiations.
24  It investigates 
deviations from rationality, and explores the consequences of cognitive errors for the 
design of legal system.
25 Behavioral Law and Economics already has strong links to 
Negotiation  Theory,  and  it  is  likely  to  come  up  with  more  suggestions  for 
improvements in the legal setting for negotiations. 
 
II.  WHY PROBLEM-SOLVING? 
Why would the promotion of problem-solving negotiations be a valuable goal? We 
will see that individuals are not always better off when they use this method and why 
that is so (A).  From the social perspective, however, it is preferable that negotiating 
parties try to problem-solve in at least some situations (B). Stimulating the use of the 
problem-solving method might have effects on third parties, though, interfere with 
other objectives of the legal system, like prevention of harm, optimal distribution (risk 
allocation  and  compensation),  and  minimizing  administrative  costs,  or  it  might 
                                                 
20 See, for instance, Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (Free Press, New 
York, 1985) and Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 101 and 
114. 
21  See  for  a  similar  approach,  based  on  a  combination  of  economic  arguments  and  sociological 
observations, Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999).  
22  See  Steven  Shavell,  Foundations  of  Economic  Analysis  of  Law  (Harvard  University  Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 2004 (forthcoming)) == for a standard treatment of the issue of bargaining failure, 
which is  often attributed to  asymmetric information, and where the  incentives proposed are  direct 
regulation, assignment of property rights, liability rules, taxes and subsidies.     
23 Compare Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 2002) ==. 
24 See, for instance, the descriptive work of Russell Korobkin, ’A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation,’ 
(2000) 88(1789) Georgetown Law Journal. 
25  Following  the  line  of  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Christine  Jolls  and  Richard  H.  Thaler,  ’A  Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1471 and Russell B. Korobkin and 
Thomas S. Ulen, ’Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics’ (2000) 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051.   11 
conflict with the ‘adversarial nature’ of that system (C). The following analysis is not 
a rigorous assessment of costs and benefits of accepting problem-solving as an extra 
objective for the legal system, if only because pursuing this is not likely to result in a 
fixed end state, that can be compared with the present situation. As usually is the case 
with an aspiration, it can lead to many different intermediate or final results. What we 
can do now is just make a preliminary inventory of where such costs and benefits 
might be located.  
A.  The Private Perspective on Problem-Solving 
The  problem-solving  method  was  developed  as  prescriptive  advice  for  individual 
negotiators. As such, it is fair to say, it has been moderately successful. Surely, it is 
taught and used all over the world, in many different contexts, from business to close 
personal relationships. It also became a framework for third party interventions in 
negotiations  and  it  is  firmly  established  in  legal  practice.
26  Transaction  lawyers, 
litigators, and even judges in settlement conferences use it in order to find solutions 
that  optimally  suit  the  preferences  of  the  parties,  in  particular  when  they  have  a 
continuing relationship. The problem-solving approach is an essential element of most 
mediation methods and underlies parallel developments in transaction practice like 
partnering.
27 Problem-solving also makes its first inroads into the legal system itself. 
Some jurisdictions introduced mandatory mediation for certain types of disputes, in 
which problem-solving is likely to be used frequently.
28 They are even experimenting 
with problem-solving courts.
29  
On the other hand, problem-solving is certainly not applied universally. Positional 
bargaining  is  still  endemic  in  legal  practice.  Many  lawyers  support  the  problem-
solving  method  in  principle,  but  do  not  use  it  regularly.
30  One  of  many  possible 
explanations is that the positional method often ‘beats’ the problem-solving one. It 
takes two to tango. If a problem-solving negotiator is confronted with a positional 
bargainer, the process is probably more likely to be positional.
31 Although negotiation 
                                                 
26 Andrea Kupfer Schneider, ’Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of 
Negotiation  Style’ (2002) 7  Harv. Negotiation L. Rev 143, 164 (empirically measuring negotiation 
styles and clustering 36 to 64% of lawyers in groups behaving in a problem-solving manner)   
27 Partnering literature === 
28 See for an overview, == = 
29 In the area of addiction, domestic violence, child neglect and quality-of-life crime, see Problem 
Solving Courts <www.problem-solvingcourts.org> accessed at April, 23, 2003. 
30 Milton Heumann and Jonathan M. Hyman, ’Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods 
in New Jersey: "You Can’t Always Get What You Want"’ (1997) 12 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resolution 
253 (reporting that 61% of the lawyers would like to see more problem-solving negotiation methods, 
but 71% of negotiations are carried out with positional methods against 16% with problem-solving 
methods). 
31 Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, ’Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict 
Between  Lawyers  in  Litigation’  (1994)  94  Columbia  Law  Review  509  and  Milton  Heumann  and 
Jonathan M. Hyman, ’Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jersey: "You 
Can’t Always Get What You Want"’ (1997) 12 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resolution 253, 266.   12 
theorists  also  supply  advice  to  negotiators  that  want  to  problem-solve,  but  are 
confronted  with  positional  or  difficult  counterparts,  lawyers  may  not  resist  too 
strongly the positional tendencies that come with their upbringing.
32      
Another reason why problem-solving is not yet the method of choice in legal practice 
may be that it does not always yield the best results. When the parties in negotiations 
about a contract or in a dispute use the problem-solving method, identifying their 
interests, finding options for mutual gain, and dividing the pie fairly, they will do well 
on  average,  because  they  will  usually  create  some  value  and  be  able  to  curb 
transaction costs. However, attempts to get a superior deal by exploiting the other 
party, ‘fishing for suckers’, are sometimes successful.
33 Which approach to negotiation 
is optimal for an individual party in a negotiation process is difficult to say because it 
depends on the way the other party reacts. This can be described in terms of two 
fundamental tensions that are difficult to manage for individual negotiators striving 
for the best outcome for themselves or for their clients.
34  
There is a tension between creating value and distributing value
35 and one between 
empathy  for  the  other  party’s  interests  and  assertiveness  regarding  one’s  own 
interests. Obtaining the best result is a matter of jointly creating value, but also of 
getting the best share when value is to be distributed. Assertiveness about one’s own 
preferences, or knowing what really is important for oneself, requires specific skills 
and expressing them has specific effects on the other party. Empathy in relation to the 
interests of the other party, understanding what the interests of another person are, 
calls for another attitude and skills. In the interaction with the other party, it may be 
difficult to find the right balance.
36 This is even more complicated because openness 
about one’s interests sometimes leads to exploitation by the other party. When the 
other party knows more about the first party’s preferences, and has some power over 
the realization of these interests, it may use this power to it’s own advantage.   
                                                 
32 See, notably, William Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating with Difficult People (Bantam Books, New 
York, 1991). 
33  Compare  Robert  H.  Mnookin,  Scott  R.  Peppet  and  Andrew  S.  Tulumello,  Beyond  winning: 
negotiating  to  create  value  in  deals  and  disputes  (Belknap  Press  of  Harvard  University  Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 2000) 322. 
34 Ibid.  (mentioning as a third tension the one between principals and agents, the conflict of interest that 
exists between clients and lawyers, for instance). 
35 Also known as ‘the negotiator’s dilemma’, see David Lax and James Sebenius, The Manager as 
Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain (Free Press, New York, 1986) == and 
Howard Raiffa, John Richardson and David Metcalfe, Negotiation Analysis; The Science and Art of 
Collaborative Decision Making (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 
2003)  85.  or  the  ‘mixed-motive’  nature  of  negotiation  situations,  see  Roy  J.  Lewicki,  David  M. 
Saunders and John W. Minton, Negotiation (3rd ed., Irwin/McGraw-Hill, Boston, 1999) 136. 
36 See Robert H. Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet and Andrew S. Tulumello, Beyond winning : negotiating to 
create value in deals and disputes (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 
2000) 44-68.   13 
B.  The Social Perspective on Problem-Solving 
From  society’s  point  of  view,  however,  it  is  much  easier  to  say  what  optimal 
negotiation and dispute resolution is. From this angle, both tensions tend to disappear. 
1.  Value Creation 
Creating  value  generally  leads  to  net  social  gains  because  the  preferences  of 
individuals  are  better  met.  The  well-being  of  the  individuals  involved  in  the 
negotiations  increases  by  definition  if  they  find  solutions  that  fit  their  interests 
optimally. The procedures for generating and evaluating alternatives that are part of 
the methods of integrative negotiations aim at finding Pareto improvements, making 
one party better off without making the other party worse off.
37 Thus, when people are 
encouraged to use these methods, when they follow these leads, and if these methods 
are any good, they are likely to find contracts and solutions for disputes that are more 
efficient.        
In many situations attempts to claim value are likely to have no net effect on the well-
being of the individuals concerned. How value is distributed between the parties in 
negotiations, including those about disputes, is something that society by and large 
leaves to them. Nowadays, legal systems allow prices and similar mechanisms that 
distribute value in contracts to take almost any value, with very few restrictions. If 
both parties are well informed and feel they are better off by settling a dispute, the 
way they divide the surplus determined by their respective batnas is, by and large, 
their  business.  So,  claiming  value  at  the  expense  of  creating  value  is  socially 
undesirable in these situations.
38  
In other situations, the legal system is concerned with distributive issues. However, 
law  mainly  influences  the  distributive  outcomes  of  contract  negotiations  and 
settlement negotiations indirectly. It does this first by determining, at least to a certain 
extent, what the court would do with a dispute if it is not settled or if an issue is left 
open in a contract. Law determines batnas.
39 Secondly, the applicable legal rules will 
have some convincing power of their own; they give neutral objective criteria to settle 
the distributive issues that will often be more acceptable to the parties than proposals 
from their opponents. If these legal rules have distributive effects that increase well-
being, it is desirable that they are followed. Deviations of them are likely to decrease 
well-being, and claiming value by one party will sometimes lead to such deviations. 
When both parties claim value, their claiming behavior probably will, on balance, lead 
                                                 
37 See Roy J. Lewicki, David M. Saunders and John W. Minton, Negotiation (3rd ed., Irwin/McGraw-
Hill, Boston, 1999) 118-128. and for more quantitative and rigorous approaches Howard Raiffa, John 
Richardson and David Metcalfe, Negotiation Analysis; The Science and Art of Collaborative Decision 
Making (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2003) 226-268. 
38 A possible escape from this conclusion is that the welfare gains from winning extra value for the 
winner (i.e. the positive feelings associated with successfully grabbing more value) are bigger than the 
welfare losses that the loser experiences from losing (i.e. the negative feelings associated with being 
exploited). Apart from the normative implications if this were the case, this is not very likely.  
39 See Chapter III.D.   14 
to the distributive effects envisaged by the rules. Then, however, claiming behavior 
may lead to unnecessary transaction costs. 
This may especially the case if negotiations take place within relationships. Pursuing 
preferences increasingly takes place within a relationship. A good example of this 
overall tendency is the shift in marketing from inducing individual sales to building a 
long-term relationship with the customer. This shows that even the paradigmatic non-
relational  contract,  the  consumer  sales  transaction,  is  just  the  same  ‘relationized’. 
Even tort many times takes place in within a relationship, or is relationized afterwards 
when people involved in accidents, or victims and insurance claim adjusters build a 
relationship to cope with the situation. Usually, a relationship will create more value 
for both parties if the tension with distributing value is managed well.   
2.  Empathy and Assertiveness   
The tension between empathy and assertiveness likewise tends to disappear when the 
negotiations are examined from society’s point of view. Both seem socially valuable, 
because they make it more likely interests are identified, and thus also that value is 
created.
40  Insofar  as  problem-solving  negotiations  stimulate  empathy  and 
assertiveness,  encouraging  them  thus  seems  to  be  a  valuable  goal  for  society  in 
general.  Society  as  a  whole  also  seems  to  have  no  interest  in  keeping  people’s 
preferences - their wishes, needs and fears – secret.
41 Individuals may wish to do that 
for tactical reasons, for fear of their weaknesses being used against them by powerful 
others, or for reasons of privacy. Stimulating people to be open about their interests, at 
least in the context of negotiations, seems to be the preferable route from the social 
point of view.
42   
So, from a social point of view the parties should create value. They should respect 
some limits on distributing value, and probably even distribute value fairly. But they 
should certainly not try to grab a bigger part of the value at the expense of jointly 
creating more value. Furthermore, the benefits of adding problem-solving as a goal 
for  the  legal  system  could,  depending  on  how  this  is  appreciated,  entail  more 
assertiveness and empathy, and thus more openness about interests.  
                                                 
40 In addition, assertiveness and empathy might be preferences themselves. Knowing and expressing 
oneself and understanding others may be valuable assets for individuals. But assertiveness could also 
lead to less welfare, if interests are asserted that can not be met, and cause negative feelings, that would 
not be there when the interests would not have been identified in the first place. Likewise, empathy 
could lead to negative emotions like sorrow or regret. 
41 Compare Jennifer Gerarda Brown and Ian Ayres, ’Economic Rationales for Mediation’ (1994) 80 
Virginia Law Review 323 (indicating that mediation can mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard). 
42 There may be a relation, though, with the extent to which individuals who are open about their 
interests are protected against exploitation. See also Chapter III.G where I make some remarks on the 
role of trust in negotiations.     15 
C.  Possible Disadvantages of Supporting Problem-Solving 
Or  does  the  use  of  the  problem-solving  method  have  side  effects  or  costs  that 
neutralize or even outweigh the advantages? We will first look at external effects, 
then to the possible interference with other goals of private law, and finally to the 
possible benefits of the adversarial system that might be foregone by the increased use 
of problem-solving. This chapter can be somewhat more concrete than the preceding 
ones, because there is research on the relationship between various forms of dispute 
resolution and prevention that gives some idea about the nature of these interactions. 
1.  Negative Impact on Third Parties? 
These side effects could, for instance, be negative externalities: damage to others than 
the parties involved in the transaction or dispute. However, because problem-solving 
is  a  method  for  negotiation,  it  will,  as  a  rule,  not  influence  people  outside  the 
negotiation arena.
43 What is more, the problem-solving method brings nothing new to 
the system of private law in this respect. Private law, in principle, deals with two-
party relationships. If a third party is influenced negatively by what the two parties do, 
that third party usually has a line of action in the two-party framework against party 
one or two, or against both: an action in tort, for instance.  
So when problem-solving is used as a tool to improve the system of private law, 
negative externalities of the method, if any, would show up in that system by that 
route.  If,  for  instance,  using  the  problem-solving  method  would  increase  the 
likelihood that the parties would create value for themselves at the expense of a third 
party, this third party would have an action in private law against them. The problem-
solving method could again play its role in this action. So, although external effects 
may exist, they are unlikely to be very substantial.      
2.  Impact on Other Goals: Prevention 
Introducing another goal for private law, relating to the interaction between parties 
when they negotiate transactions and disputes, could also impair the traditional goals 
of private law. It is likely that a change in the way transactions are negotiated and 
disputes are resolved would influence the incentives provided by the legal system to 
take measures to prevent damage. But how this would happen, is hard to say. There 
are many studies that have investigated the effects of different procedural regimes on 
prevention.
44 These studies suggest that procedural reforms may influence the level of 
prevention  by  changing  the  number  of  suits  brought,  the  litigation  costs  for 
                                                 
43 Some critics of ADR, though, hold that creative solutions of disputes tend to go at the expense of 
third parties, see David Luban, ’Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm’ (1995) 83 Geo. L.J 
2619, 2627. To my knowledge, there is no empirical research supporting this allegation. Furthermore, 
the real issue is whether problem-solving negotiations do worse in this respect than other current forms 
of dealing with differences, like settlements obtained by positional negotiations.  
44 See for a recent overview Bruce H. Kobayashi and Jeffrey S. Parker, ’Civil Procedure: General’ in 
Bouckaert  and  De  Geest  (eds),  Encyclopedia  of  Law  and  Economics  (Edward  Elgar,  Cheltenham, 
2000) 1-26.   16 
defendants, and the distribution of outcomes of suits or settlements.
45 But it is not easy 
to use this literature for a rigorous cost/benefits analysis of a system of private law 
with  problem-solving  as  an  additional  goal.  Most  of  this  literature  deals  with  the 
system of private law in isolation, assuming that there are no other incentives than 
private law sanctions, although there are many of those, and they are increasingly 
taken into consideration.
46 Moreover, this literature is often based on the assumption 
that individuals act rationally, an assumption that may or may not be questionable in 
general, but is taken to the limits of its usefulness when applied to people in a dispute, 
whose behavior is difficult to model in terms of rational decision making, because of 
cognitive  imperfections and the sheer complexity of  the  information they have to 
process.
47 Although  this test might therefore not be a decisive  one, evaluating the 
impact of adding problem-solving as a goal for private law on the basis of the Law 
and Economics literature about dispute resolution, with its stress on prevention, would 
still  give  valuable  information  about  the  way  a  system  such as  the  one  proposed 
would influence harmful conduct.  
This literature generally sees litigation costs as a social waste, caused by failure to 
predict  the  court  decision  or  by  other  settlement  failures,  unless  the  parties  seek 
precedents  or  want  to  preclude  future  litigation  by  others.
48  Litigation  should  be 
discouraged when the deterrence benefit (the reduction in harm prevented less the 
costs of preventive measures) is lower than the litigation costs.
49 So, lower litigation 
costs are desirable in principle, and more problem-solving in dispute resolution could 
contribute to lowering litigation costs. Lower litigation costs will in turn lead more 
people to bring suit, and thus to better prevention.  
There is, however, a possible trade-off with accuracy. If litigation costs are linked to 
lower  quality  outcomes,  for  instance  because  the  outcomes  of  litigation  become 
erratic, people who should take preventive measures will experience lower incentives 
to take these measures and will not take optimal care. On the other hand, individuals 
who need not take care may be induced to take unnecessary preventive measures.
50 
This literature strongly suggests that extra investments in accuracy become wasteful at 
a  certain  level.  Whether  the  increased  use  of  the  problem-solving  method  would 
reduce the accuracy in adjudication, and to which level, remains to be seen.  
                                                 
45    See  Louis  Kaplow  and  Steven  Shavell,  Fairness  Versus  Welfare  (Harvard  University  Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 2002) 225-227 and 248-250. 
46  See note === (Collins). 
47 See Lee Ross and Constance Stillinger, ’Barriers to Conflict Resolution’ (1991) 7 Negotiation J 389 
and Kenneth J. Arrow, et al. (eds), Barriers to Conflict Resolution (W.W. Norton & Company, New 
York, 1995). 
48 Bruce H. Kobayashi and Jeffrey S. Parker, ’Civil Procedure: General’ in Bouckaert and De Geest 
(eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2000) 1-26. 
49 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 2002) 227 and 235. and Keith N. Hylton, ’Agreements to Waive or Arbitrate Legal Claims: An 
Economic Analysis’ (2000) 8 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 209, 235. 
50 Warren F. Schwartz, ’0790 Legal Error’ in Bouckaert and De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2000) 1029-1040.   17 
A related issue is that changes in dispute resolution systems may alter the expected 
outcomes  of  disputes  and  thus  the  incentives,  for  instance  because  they  reduce 
payments to plaintiffs.
51 A recent article summarizes and extends the literature on the 
effects of compromise verdicts on prevention.
52 Compromise verdicts are the type of 
verdicts  that  apportion  liability  in  the  case  of  uncertainty  over  liability,  or  more 
conventionally, in the case of comparative negligence or uncertainty over causation. 
They are very relevant for our topic because the use of objective criteria as a means to 
distribute value is likely to raise the number of compromises in proportion to the 
number  of  all-or-nothing  outcomes.
53  The  article  criticizes  an  earlier  discussion
54 
reporting  better  prevention  by  compromise  verdicts  and  comes  to  the  tentative 
conclusion that a system of compromise verdicts will not have an effect on prevention 
compared to an all-or-nothing system.
55   
As we will see, the problem-solving method could also entail avoiding the blame 
frame.
56 Rules of conduct would be less central in tort and other disputes, and would 
be replaced by other criteria for distributing losses such as (causal) contribution. This 
is not a new issue, however. The standard Law and Economics approach to the choice 
between negligence, liability based on rules of conduct, and strict liability, based on 
causal  contribution,  is  that  what  matters  is  that  the  defendant  is  made  to  pay.
57 
Whether the basis is negligence or strict liability mainly affects the litigation costs, the 
level of activity, and the distributive effects, but not prevention. Apparently, these 
scholars did not  find it necessary to adjust their models to  take into account  that 
saying that a defendant has acted wrongly has more preventive effect than saying the 
defendant is responsible for the damage.
58  The idea is that the defendant will infer that 
preventive measures are to be taken when they are cost effective.  
A fuller account of the effects of adding problem-solving as a goal of private law 
should include indications  that prevention is better served by systems  that do not 
                                                 
51 Steven Shavell, ’Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis’ (1996) 24 J. Legal Studies 
1, 20. 
52 Michael Abramowicz, ’A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts’ (2001) 89 California Law 
Review 231. 
53 See III.D.3 
54 Steven Shavell, ’Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability’ (1985) 28 J.L. 
Econ. 587. 
55 Michael Abramowicz, ’A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts’ (2001) 89 California Law 
Review 231, 275 (stating also that a mixed verdict system, that is a system where judges or juries would 
give all-or-nothing verdicts when they have a relatively high confidence in their determination, but 
compromise verdicts in more uncertain cases, would be superior to the compromise system). 
56 See Chapter III.F. 
57  Hans-Bernd  Schäfer  and  Andreas  Schönenberger,  '3100  Strict  Liability  Versus  Negligence'  in 
Bouckaert  and  De  Geest  (eds),  Encyclopedia  of  Law  and  Economics,  Volume  II.  Civil  Law  and 
Economics (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2000) 597-624. 
58 See for an approach that includes ‘guilt’ and ‘virtue’ as incentives, which approach could be extended 
to include blame and could be applied to the issue of strict liability versus negligence liability, note == 
(Kaplow/Shavell, Moral Sentiments).   18 
focus  on  individual  blame,  but  on  contribution,  especially  in  complex  institutions 
where many people interact, such as hospitals.
59 When the blame frame is abandoned, 
the parties may feel more free to discuss possible causes of damage and possible 
remedies. What we can conclude, for now, is that there are no overwhelming signals 
from  the existing  literature  that adding  problem-solving  as  a  goal  for  private  law 
would  seriously  inhibit  its  preventive  effects,  and  that  it  is  worth  investigating 
whether it may contribute to better prevention in some situations.   
3.  Optimal Distribution (Risk Allocation and Compensation) 
A second traditional goal of tort law and the law of contracts is what we may call 
optimal distribution. It includes contributions to the well- being of individuals through 
the allocation of risk, by granting risk-averse parties compensation, for instance. And 
it also covers other possible reasons for redistribution that may be reflected in the 
rules of private law, such as allocation to ‘needy’ persons.  
As to these distributive issues, intuition might suggest that stimulating the problem-
solving  method  would  lead  to  better  results  given  that  it  stresses fair  distribution 
against objective criteria.
60 As long as these objective criteria, which can be set by the 
legal system, reflect the desired level of compensation and access to court does not 
become more costly,
61 the goals of optimal distribution or compensation seem not to 
conflict with the goal of problem-solving. There may be worries that the problem-
solving method will allow some parties to escape their compensation duties wholly or 
partly because the system would become less threatening to people who try to run 
away from their compensation duties, but that is a matter of prevention, which we 
have already discussed.    
4.  Controlling Administrative Costs 
The last traditional goal of the system of private law is the control of administrative 
costs. Transaction costs, including the costs of contracting, will sometimes be higher 
when problem-solving bargaining methods are used and will be lower at other times. 
Especially  in  simple  transactions  like  consumer  sales,  where  the  pie  is  fixed, 
distributive bargaining can be less costly than problem-solving. Generally, if problem-
solving  does  not  create  enough  extra  value  to  compensate  for  the  extra  costs, 
distributive bargaining will be superior from a social point of view. In more complex 
situations, when the parties already have a relationship, for instance, problem-solving 
will often be preferable.  
The same basic reasoning applies to dispute resolution. Because the administrative 
costs of the tort and dispute resolution system are huge, adding a goal that promises 
reductions in these costs in at least some cases is probably one of the main reasons 
why an additional goal of problem-solving would be welcomed.  
                                                 
59 See Chapter III.F. 
60 See Chapter III.D.3. 
61 Compare Chapter III.C.   19 
5.  Losing the Benefits of the Adversarial System? 
Many of the issues that would come up when problem-solving were admitted as such 
an additional goal have been raised in the more general debate on the pros and cons of 
adversarial litigation.
62 This debate is far from ready to be concluded. But, for many, it 
is a non-starter: the adversarial system has become so engrained in society that it 
cannot be changed. Moreover, the comprehensive alternatives that were formulated 
for  it,  inquisitorial  processes  and  increased  government  regulation,  have  obvious 
drawbacks as well. Some scholars have touched upon other alternatives, but they have 
not offered a sufficiently complete description of them.
63  
For the purposes of this article, it is not necessary to take position in this debate 
because the essence  of what  is being discussed is  the addition of tools for better 
contracting,  an  area  where  the  adversarial  system  only  provides  background 
incentives, and the transformation of dispute resolution for some disputes. It does not 
question the adversarial system as a means to enforce unambiguous obligations, to 
uncover fraudulent conduct, or to deal with criminal prosecution.  
Still, some of the lines of thought from this debate are useful when we try to assess 
the  possible  interaction  between  problem-solving  and  the  adversarial  system. 
Defenders of the adversarial system point to the following strong points. It prevents 
wrongful  conduct  by  exposing  and  punishing  it.  It  stresses  the  autonomy  and 
individual dignity of human beings, especially in confrontations with governments 
and  other  powerful  institutions,  among  other  things  because  it  embodies  the 
fundamental  right  to  be  heard.
64  It  takes  the  heat  out  of  social  struggles  by 
transforming them in courtroom battles. It is the most effective way to determine the 
truth.
65  It  is  also  an  indispensable  tool  for  looking  at  disputes  from  different 
perspectives, in particular because adversary presentation seems the only effective 
means of combating the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the 
familiar that which is not yet fully known.
66 
These benefits of the adversarial system are appealing, and they warrant a much more 
thorough  discussion  than  is  possible  here.  At  first  sight,  however,  some  of  these 
benefits may not be endangered, or even be enhanced if problem-solving would be 
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introduced  as  an  element  of  the  system.  Being  heard  is  an  essential  element  of 
problem-solving as well.
67 Autonomy and dignity are central values in this process, 
although  we  will  see  that  the  autonomy  of  the  participants  in  a  problem-solving 
procedure may have a different character.
68 Protection of individual human dignity and 
interests in relation to powerful government or other institutions can be given within 
the problem-solving approach by improving access to court.
69 Reducing accusations 
based on attribution of blame and intent when these are mainly means to obtain access 
to compensation might even lead to extra protection of human dignity.
70 Looking at a 
situation from different perspectives could be one of the central qualities of problem-
solving  adjudication,  if  performed  in  a  facilitating  manner,  because  it  not  only 
stimulates  the  parties  to  voice  these  perspectives,  but even  to  give  recognition  in 
regard of the perspective of the other party.
71  
Taking  the  heat  out  of  social  struggles  can  probably  also  be  done  by  a  more 
cooperative process than a ‘courtroom battle’, although there may be situations in 
which a truly adversarial debate is the best outlet for the emotions involved. There are 
many striking examples of adversarial litigation uncovering the truth. Whether it is 
always the most effective and cost-efficient way to determine the optimal amount of 
truth is another issue. Increasingly, discovery is undertaken on terms determined by 
the  parties  in  cooperation  and,  if  they  cannot  agree,  by  court  intervention.  This 
suggests it could be made into a component of a problem-solving procedure, at least 
in some situations. The same goes for adversary presentation in situations in which 
the  interpretation of  past events or  a legal issue is the key to  the  solution  of the 
dispute. Finally, although ADR processes are often criticized for their inability to 
create  a  sufficient  number  of  precedents,  there  is  nothing  in  the  problem-solving 
method itself that makes it impossible to use the results as input for the way future 
disputes between other parties are decided.
72 
In sum: it is too early to assess how problem-solving as an additional goal for private 
law  would  affect  the  other  goals  of  the  system  or  the  valuable  elements  of  the 
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adversarial system. On the other hand, it might contribute to solutions for some of the 
drawbacks the present system has.  
III.  PROBLEM-SOLVING AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
How the problem-solving method could inspire change in the legal system will now 
be discussed more in detail. For this analysis, I will distinguish seven key elements of 
the problem-solving method, which first will be explained briefly. For each element, I 
will then consider the rules and practices of private law that are already consistent 
with the problem-solving method as well as those which conflict with it. Finally, I 
will discuss how these rules and practices could be brought in line with the problem-
solving method. This discussion is preliminary. Many important aspects of private law 
will not be discussed. 
A.  Interests 
1.  ‘Focus on interests, not on positions’ 
Problem-solving  negotiations  are  sometimes  called  interest-based  negotiations, 
because  they  take  interests  and  not  positions  as  their  focus.  The  idea  is  that  the 
negotiating parties try to protect their interests, their wishes, fears and desires, as the 
items that have to be protected by negotiated outcomes. The negotiation literature 
distinguishes four types of interests.
73  
Substantive  interests  include  economic  and  financial  needs,  but  also  any  other 
individual  preference  of  a  person  that  he  or  she  wants  to  protect  through  the 
negotiations. In negotiations with neighbors, a person strives for a peaceful and quiet 
living environment. Another person needs new opportunities for personal growth and 
sources  of  income  in  negotiations  with  his  former  employer.  A  manufacturer  of 
household appliances needs reliable components and discusses this with a supplier.  
Process interests relating to the way negotiations take place or a dispute is settled are 
also  relevant,  however.  Inferences  about  what  different  people  may  value  as 
procedural interests can be made from the literature on participant satisfaction with 
dispute resolution processes, which posits a wide array of such interests.
74 Procedural 
justice  theorists  often  focus  on  third  party  interventions  and  stress  elements  like 
impartiality of a neutral decision maker, giving grounds for decisions, neutrality of the 
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process, trust, treatment of participants, and voice or opportunity to be heard.
75 The 
‘group  value  model’  suggests  that  people  value  procedures  that  encourage 
participation  and confirm  membership status.
76  The  ‘interactional justice’  approach 
advises that people value the interpersonal treatment they get and attach importance to 
truthfulness,  respect,  propriety  of  questions,  trust,  friendliness,  openness  and 
justification in the interaction.
77 
Relationship interests refer to the intrinsic value people or organizations can put on a 
relationship, but also to the instrumental calculation of the future benefits and costs of 
such a relationship. There are reasons to believe that these interests are increasingly 
relevant. Connections not only to spouses, parents and children, but also to friends, 
neighbors,  acquaintances,  employees,  business  partners,  suppliers,  customers  and 
advisers are now commonly described as relationships, signaling that the parties have 
certain expectations about these connections. Some researchers even see the ‘need to 
belong’ as a fundamental human motivation.
78  
Finally, people have interests in principle. They value ideas about what is fair or right, 
either  because  they  intrinsically  or  instrumentally  want  to  be  treated  that  way  or 
because they even want to see these principles being applied more generally. People 
have ‘tastes for notions of fairness.’
79  
Interests come in different layers. Beneath the need for high-quality components lies 
the need of the manufacturer to be able to deliver attractive products; beyond that, 
there are the interests of the people employed by the manufacturer to preserve their 
income  and  their  reputation.  Underlying  human  needs  that  are  often  relevant  in 
negotiations, whether in transactions or in disputes, are basic psychological and safety 
needs, but also the need for recognition, respect, affirmation, and self-actualization.
80 
These  needs  not  only  apply  to  individuals,  but  also  to  groups  with  which  these 
individuals  identify,  including  the  organizations  in  which  they  live  or  work.  This 
makes a broad conception of interests equally relevant for business transactions and 
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disputes,  though  not  necessarily  to  the  same  extent  as  for  interactions  between 
individuals.  
2.  Rights and Interests  
In the existing legal system, the focus is on rights. Often, rights reflect underlying 
interests.  But  not  every  interest  is  covered  by  a  right.  The  most  important  rights 
granted by private law are property rights, remedies relating to the performance of 
contracts,  and  remedies  that  protect  against  tortious  conduct.  These  rights  cover 
important  substantive  interests:  property  rights  protect  interests  connected  to  the 
possession and use of goods. Contractual rights cover interests in obtaining products, 
services, or money. Other substantive interests, however, like health interests or those 
related  to  leisure  activities,  are  less  completely  protected.  The  recognition  of 
substantive interests is an ongoing process. The debates among lawyers on rights to 
privacy, on protection against pure economic loss, and on new heads of damages can 
be  interpreted  as  interests  having  to  struggle  for  acceptance  by  the  legal  system. 
Another  problem  is  that  private  law  remedies,  such  as  damages,  injunctions,  or 
specific performance, sometimes only offer indirect protection. The remedy does not 
correspond one-to-one with the interest. When you worry about your future health, the 
remedy of damages does not directly addresses this fear.
81  
We saw that process interests relating to the way a transaction is negotiated or a 
dispute is settled are also relevant. The rules of contract law protect some procedural 
interests, the preference of most people to be told the truth, for instance, through the 
rules  regarding  fraud.  Generally,  however,  the  procedure  of  contracting  is  rather 
undefined.  Contract  law  does  not  have  much  to  say  about  the  way  parties  could 
communicate in order to preserve process interests like confirmation of membership 
in the group, respect, friendliness, and justification.
82 Similarly, the law and practice 
relating to dispute resolution only partially protects procedural interests like voice, 
neutrality, and impartiality. The ability to voice opinions is limited because the parties 
cannot always communicate themselves, but have to speak through lawyers. Another 
restriction  on  voicing  opinions  and  interests  is  that  the  procedure  before  a  court 
concentrates on substantive issues and not every substantive issue is translatable into a 
right. Any one who has been in a courtroom knows that the parties sometimes want to 
speak about matters other than the legally relevant ones.  
Relationship  interests,  the  intrinsic  value  people  or  organizations  can  put  on  a 
relationship, and the instrumental calculation of the future benefits and costs of a 
relationship, also have difficulties finding their place in the legal system. There are 
several reasons why private law has problems with valuing relationships. One of them 
is that contract law and tort law are built on the autonomy of individuals and their 
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preferences. The interaction between people, which is what defines their relationship, 
is seen as a sequence of individual acts.
83  
The ideas people have about what is fair or right, in their specific situation or in 
general,  their  ‘tastes  for  notions  of  fairness’,  are  protected  in  the  sense  that  they 
sometimes can ask a court to confirm or reject these ideas. They can voice them if 
these tastes fit in the picture their lawyers present and the court finds them legally 
relevant. Their tastes for notions of fairness, however, might not coincide with the 
fairness ideas that are embedded in the legal system. 
This preliminary analysis of the way interests are reflected in rights is disquieting; the 
picture that seems to emerge is that private law does not have a natural place for all 
interests that are relevant in the interactions between people that are governed by 
private  law.  Is  this  worrisome?  Presumably  it  is.  The  incomplete  protection  of 
interests  is  likely  to  place  strain  on  the  system  that  may  be  avoidable.  A  well-
documented cause of litigation is, for instance, that people feel badly treated by others 
who are involved in traumatic experiences, like patients and relatives who suffer from 
the adverse effects of medical treatment. What they expect is a ‘sorry’, or at least an 
open acknowledgement of empathy.
84 Their rights do not directly protect such needs, 
however, and the legal system sometimes even discourages apologies by allowing 
them as proof of liability. This is but one example of interests relevant to the dispute 
in its initial phase not being covered by rights and therefore not having a natural place 
in litigation or in the legal negotiations that precede it. If certain interests cannot be 
protected by the legal system at all, or only incompletely, so that they have to be 
wholly or partly dropped by the interested party, this is likely to cause frustration and 
related negative emotions.  
These negative feelings are not only an extra harm by themselves, but they can also 
complicate the process of dispute resolution. Sometimes it is possible to keep these 
interests  on  the  bargaining  table,  by  exaggerating  other  interests  that  are  better 
covered by rights and using these as bargaining chips: a person wanting protection of 
his or her procedural and relational interests through an apology is building a damage 
claim on facts that would, by themselves, not be sufficient reason to sue. This again 
complicates the resolution of disputes in negotiations and in court as interests that are 
wholly or partly faked enter the dispute. Disputants may also have to hide their real 
interests,  because  their  bargaining  position  in  the  ‘litigotiation’  game  would 
deteriorate if their real interests became known.  
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3.  ‘Taking Interests Seriously’ 
Why does private law only protect a selection of the things valued by humans? Is this 
just a matter of a tradition that becomes outdated in times when we have discovered 
many other interests worthy of protection? Or is there an inherent reason for a limited 
perception  of  interests  that  can  be  protected  directly  through  legal  rights?  Is  the 
condensation that takes place when interests are protected through rights a necessary 
one, because it entails a useful reduction of complexity, for instance? One of the 
reasons that private law protects ‘stylized’ interests through rights could be that this is 
the only feasible way to deal with the endless variety of individual interests and the 
ways they can clash. Or will the actual interests always reappear so that this reduction 
of complexity is only a temporary and maybe even a delusory one?  
For now, we may at least observe that many fierce debates in private law have to do 
with acknowledgement of interests, the things people value, by the legal system. A 
systematic study of the way interests are protected by private law could reveal where 
the next legal battles can be expected, and probably even their outcomes, as we may 
expect  that  interests  that  many  people  share  and  value  will  eventually  become 
protected by a right. Such an analysis could, for instance, be done for each of the four 
types  of  interests  that  we  can  distinguish:  substantive,  procedural,  relational,  and 
interests in principle. Taking the message seriously that interests, the real preferences 
of people, are what matters, could thus be a powerful tool for understanding new 
developments in private law, and even accelerating them. Making the legal system 
more responsive to interests is likely to increase human well-being.  
In legal practice, lawyers designing contracts could become more aware of procedural 
and relational interests, and might be able to accommodate them through contractual 
solutions. In partnering contracts, for instance, it is not uncommon to design charters 
of cooperation in which the parties define principles for their communication and for 
their  approach  to  possible  disputes.
85  Such  programs  could  be  extended  to  other 
contracts  regarding  intensive  relationships.  More  speculatively,  the  default  rules 
regarding formation of such contracts could be linked to guidelines for negotiating 
this type of charters or legal systems could find other  ways to stimulate  ways  of 
contracting that are more sensitive to procedural and relational interests.   
If private law could find ways to improve the way it covers interests, its processes 
could also become less perturbed by mismatches between rights and interests. People 
would feel less need to invoke rights that are not backed by genuine interests, and 
they would have to struggle less for legal recognition of real interests. Whether a 
greater protection of interests through private law is realistic, however, is not just a 
matter of acknowledging interests, giving people access to the legal system to have 
their ‘interests taken seriously.’ The legal system also has to cope with conflicting 
interests.     
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B.  Value Creation 
1.  ‘Invent options for mutual gain’ 
This brings us to the next step in the problem-solving process: finding solutions that 
maximally accommodate the interests of both parties. When they have identified the 
underlying interests, something that can be difficult for many reasons,
86 the parties 
should try to find a range of solutions that serve the set consisting all their relevant 
interests  optimally.  These  are  solutions  located  at  the  Pareto-frontier,  where  it 
becomes  impossible  to  make  one  party  better  off  without  making  the  other  party 
worse off.
87 Take again a dispute between a long-time supplier of components such as 
memory chips, and a manufacturer of household appliances about the quality of the 
chips. The manufacturer is worried about the quality, because performance tests show 
the chips do not meet the specifications, and he is angry with the supplier for his 
initial denial of this. The supplier has had an isolated manufacturing problem and 
some  shortage  in  qualified  personnel.  They  might  explore  a  number  of  possible 
elements  of  solutions:  temporarily  exchanging  personnel,  exchanging  test  results, 
temporarily buying chips from another source, testing the final products in order to 
see  whether  their  quality  is  impaired  by  the  lower  quality  chips,  new  procedural 
agreements about self reporting of quality problems by the supplier, an apology for 
the miscommunication, letting other employees on both sides be the contacts, building 
a  stronger  relationship  by  letting  people  interact  socially,  or  terminating  the 
cooperation in a coordinated manner that minimizes damage.  
This value creation is indeed a creative process in which the parties look for solutions 
that satisfy one or more interests without hurting other interests that the parties have, 
or, if this is not possible, with minimal damage to these other interests. It is not always 
easy to find solutions that meet the substantive interests because the resources may be 
limited. Exploring the next layers of interests below the superficially relevant ones 
may disclose new opportunities for value creation, however. It is often less difficult to 
accommodate procedural and relational interests because the price of meeting them is 
usually  not  high,  and  the  value  for  the  person  invoking  them  can  be  substantial. 
Showing respect or making an apology requires only a little effort and sincerity.   
In  order  to  optimize  value  creation,  parties  are  commonly  advised  to  list  their 
interests, often literally by writing them down on a flip-over, and then brainstorm 
about solutions that best suit them.
 88 At this stage, they should generate many different 
solutions without evaluating them.
 89 To begin with, the solutions that could possibly 
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contribute to the solving of the problem should be identified. Brainstorming should 
continue  for  longer  than  intuitively  necessary.  Ways  to  exploit  the  differences 
between the parties should be listed: they may differ in expectations, have different 
risk preferences, different needs as to timing, or value scarce resources differently.
90 It 
is better also to list unrealistic options because they might show the way to options 
that are more suitable. At this stage, the parties can disregard whose interests are best 
served by the solutions developed; they will evaluate the proposals at a later stage. 
Proposals that are too advantageous for one party can then be transformed into more 
acceptable ones, by letting this party compensate the other party in money or in other 
interests. 
2.  Rights, Claims and Value Creation 
In the setting of the legal system, the track towards solutions is a different one. As we 
have seen, interests have to be translated into alleged rights. Private law allocates 
property rights that can be traded. Most substantive interests and some other interests 
can be translated into tradable contractual rights as well. Contract law has an open 
structure, based on freedom of contract, with few exceptions that limit the range of 
possible solutions that the parties may consider in order to best serve their interests. 
Therefore, many solutions are possible, but nothing is guaranteed. Whether rights are 
traded in a way that maximizes preferences is something contract law does not, in 
principle, deal with. Contract law is not concerned with processes of negotiation that 
lead to good, better, or even optimal contracts. 
In a dispute, the parties have to translate their interests into rights or defenses. Next, 
the party alleging that his or her rights have been infringed can choose one of the 
remedies  the  law  permits.  In  the  example,  the  natural  way  to  do  this  for  the 
manufacturer  would  be  to  compare  the  quality  of  the  chips  with  the  agreed 
specifications. Any deficiency would amount to a breach of contract. Then, the system 
invites  the  manufacturer  to  choose  a  remedy  that  best  suits  the  manufacturer’s 
interests: damages, termination of the contract when the breach could be shown to be 
fundamental,  or  specific  performance.
91  The  supplier  can  choose  to  deny  that  the 
delivered goods did not meet the specifications, or it can try to invoke defenses. In 
practice, disputes like this will often become an argument over whether the parties 
were in breach of their obligations and the remedy of choice is probably monetary 
compensation.  While  disputing  about  the  merits  of  this  claim,  the  parties  will 
probably try to solve the problem in other ways, but there is nothing in the legal 
system that stimulates them to systematically list their interests, and to methodically 
search for solutions. On the contrary, the law of civil procedure is basically attuned to 
reviewing  the  positions  of  the  parties  on  their  legal  merits,  and  therefore  invites 
positional rather than integrative bargaining. In practice, relatively new institutions 
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like  settlement  conferences  establish  settings  that  enable  a  search  for  creative 
solutions.  However,  they  can  also  be  used  for  other  types  of  negotiations  or 
information exchange and, in most legal systems, it depends on the preferences of the 
individual  judge  whether  and  how  the  problem-solving  method  of  developing 
solutions is used.  
Other examples of the limitations the legal system puts on the search for creative 
solutions can be found where people experience harm that is not easy to translate into 
monetary value, for example, when they cannot make use of their time in the way they 
expected: spoiled vacations, time spent waiting, or time spent on dealing with claims. 
Many  jurisdictions  have  started,  hesitantly  and  step  by  step,  to  compensate  such 
interests in money, but there is still much doubt about the criteria for the assessment 
of such damages in the light of the personal circumstances of the victim. Is the value 
of time to be related to the earnings that could have been realized during the lost time, 
to what a person would have paid for higher quality use of that time, or to an abstract 
rate  set  at  a  rather  arbitrary  level  for  everyone?  Stimulating  people  to  take  such 
interests into account by making them pay damages might be a costly and indirect 
way of prevention. Private law could also look for more direct tools to encourage 
people to be more careful with other people’s time. It could, for instance, adopt rules 
requiring providers of goods and services to have smooth procedures for complaints 
and claim handling, to reveal waiting times in queues and other delays, or even to 
minimize those times and delays. 
In other respects, private law has become more open to different solutions, tailored to 
the  interests  of  the  parties  in  their  particular circumstances.  Arguably, one  of  the 
prevailing developments in private law during the 20
th century was the one towards 
individualizing solutions for disputes. Courts and academics alike deeply felt a need 
to  make  court  decisions  more  contextual,  to  take  into  account  more  different 
circumstances of the case, in short to fit the decision to the case at hand.
92 Many 
private lawyers, even academics that are trained to see the patterns in what they study, 
turned away from rule based decision making. Rules of private law became more 
open ended, often by adopting open standards referring to reasonableness, reasonable 
expectations, or general doctrines which area of application is not clearly delimited.  
This approach has been criticized, because court decisions become less predictable in 
such a legal environment. Moreover, settlement negotiations and litigation become 
more costly when more circumstances of the case are considered relevant. The move 
away from rule-based decision making also implies that decision costs are shifted 
from  the  rule-making  procedure  to  individual  decision  making.  Especially  in 
situations that occur frequently in similar forms, this may lead to substantial extra 
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costs.
93 Finally, equal treatment may suffer. Nominally, it is guaranteed by applying 
the same general rules to everybody. But because these rules leave much discretion to 
the parties or the judge applying the rules, they may lead to different results in similar 
cases.  
3.  Stimulating Value Creation 
If the legal system were to aim at problem-solving, value creation could structure the 
search  for solutions that serve the interests  of the parties that  negotiate contracts. 
Thus,  contract  law  could  provide  incentives  for  value  creation,  by  stimulating 
disclosure of interests, for instance. Also, contract models often have some room for 
recitals.  Explaining  what  the  parties  are  up  to  in  the  contract  is  considered  good 
practice.  A  more  structured  manner  of  reciting  all  relevant  interests,  not  only  the 
substantive needs of the parties, but also their procedural and relational ones, with the 
inclusion of their concerns and fears, could have an effect similar to that of the listing 
of interests on a flip-over, that is often recommended in negotiation handbooks. It 
could invite the parties, and their lawyers, to systematically search for value-creating 
solutions,  given  the  interests  that  the  parties  have  in  the  relationship  that  will  be 
subject to the contract.  
Value creation could also be an objective when rules regarding contract interpretation, 
default  rules,  or  contract  models  are  developed.
94  Studying  the  process  of  value 
creation,  and  in  particular  the  possibility  of  finding  a  range  of  value  maximizing 
options at the Pareto-frontier, could also contribute to theories about contractual gap-
filling. Moreover, the possibility of value creation could be a reason to remove legal 
obstacles  to  renegotiation,  which  may  have  to  be  stimulated  not  just  in  case  of 
unforeseen circumstances or hardship, but whenever value can be created that exceeds 
the  additional  transaction  costs.
95  The  parties  can  often  make  adjustments  to  an 
existing agreement that serve their interests even better, without having to re-establish 
the contractual equilibrium.
96  How they divide  the  value, the contract price  or the 
principles for determining this, which is often the most difficult element to agree on, 
can remain unchanged, but in the course of their relationship, the parties can continue 
to create value. In fact, this often happens in practice, but then without a change of the 
underlying contract documents. Integrating this practice into the formal contractual 
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relationship, and stimulating it, would generally advance the interests of contracting 
parties.
97  
When the step of value creation is considered, we also better appreciate the value of 
taking procedural and relational interests into account. At first sight, this seems to 
complicate the negotiations, but it makes solution easier in the end because they often 
present clear opportunities for value creation. Is this, taking process and relational 
interests  into  account,  not  one  of  the  primary  tools  of  sales  people?  Researchers 
studying the dynamics of problem-solving negotiations suggest that once people start 
creating value on these interests, they may achieve the momentum necessary to break 
through the next, probably more difficult issues.
98 This probably holds even more for 
disputes, which often have their roots in disregard of process or relational interests.  
Dispute  resolution  procedures,  whether  provided  contractually  or  by  default  civil 
procedure  rules,  could  also  give  value  creation  a  clear  place.  For  instance,  civil 
procedure rules could promote the listing of interests and possible solutions in the 
documents that are exchanged between the parties in the early stages of proceedings. 
In  settlement  conferences,  brainstorming  about  solutions  could  become  standard 
practice. Protocols for the pre-action phase,
99 or even the lawyers’ codes of conduct, 
could support processes in which the parties communicate about their interests and 
possible solutions, rather than their claims and defenses.  
This line of reasoning could even be taken one step further. If the parties cannot agree 
on a solution, a court could impose one of the solutions at the Pareto frontier of 
maximum value creation, or the closest to this it can get on the basis of the interests of 
the parties disclosed to it. It would not have to fall back on an evaluation of the legal 
merits of the claim. This would be a rather revolutionary approach. But in its practical 
effects, it would not be that far removed from what many courts now do, that is, trying 
to find a reasonable solution for the dispute, and then fitting it in the applicable legal 
rules, bending these or creating ad hoc exceptions to them if necessary.  
Problem-solving private law could thus take the development towards individualized 
decision  making  to  the  extreme.  It  would  recognize  that  disputes  involve  many 
different interests of the parties and that different people value assets, tangible or 
intangible,  differently. By  definition, this  would  lead  to  different  ways  of  finding 
integrative solutions in different disputes and to different outcomes of distributive 
issues. One of the secrets of modern dispute resolution is using differences creatively. 
Or would such an attitude of courts impair equal treatment and erode valuable rules of 
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private law that would not be enforced anymore? We will come back to this question 
later.
100 
C.  Distribution: Batna 
1.  ‘Develop Your Batna’ 
Apart from trying to create value, negotiating parties have to distribute value. They 
have  to  choose  between  the  different  possible  solutions  at  the  Pareto  frontier  of 
options best serving their joint interests. Expanding the pie makes division easier in 
one respect: there is more to gain for both parties. But the division problem is still 
there. The buyer and the seller of the company can maximize value by optimizing the 
timing and financing of the transaction. They can determine where they prefer the key 
employees to go with the company or to stay with the seller. But they also have to 
agree on a price,  which is a purely distributive issue. In  disputes,  the parties can 
likewise find ways to best serve the interests, but often they also have to decide on the 
size of a compensatory payment by one party to the other party.  
The  distribution  problem  does  not  go  away  by  following  the  problem-solving 
method.
101 This is reflected by the next recommendation the problem-solving approach 
has on offer. One basic piece of advice to the parties is not to accept a settlement or 
other negotiated outcome when the batna (best alternative to negotiated agreement) is 
superior to the offer on the table.
102 In transactions, the parties can look for alternative 
deals  elsewhere on the market. Their  batna is usually the deal they can get from 
another market  party, less the search costs  and the extra costs of negotiating  that 
transaction. In disputes, the batna is often the likely outcome for a party of court 
proceedings: the expected court decision, which can be represented as a probability 
distribution of outcomes, taking into account difficulties at the enforcement stage, 
minus the costs of litigation. Incidentally, the recommendation that the parties should 
identify their best alternative to agreement and not accept a deal that leaves them 
worse off is not different from what is advisable in distributive negotiations. The 
batna is essentially the same concept as the reservation price or walk away point that 
parties in purely distributive bargaining should determine.
103  
In both types of negotiations, the parties can influence their own batnas. For instance, 
they can start parallel negotiations with another interested party. In conflicts, they can 
hire a reputable lawyer and take procedural steps that improve their chances in court. 
Sometimes they can even influence the batna of the other party. A powerful company 
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may be able to force terms on a contracting party by threatening to withhold other 
essential products or services if it does not accept these terms. Likewise, a party in a 
dispute can deteriorate the alternative for the other party of going to court by making 
this more costly. The legal system provides or allows many such weapons: costly 
discovery requests, freezing of assets, claiming through the corporate veil, publicizing 
claims,  and  commitments  to  appeal  any  negative  court  decision  are  among  the 
commonest examples. 
An  important  characteristic  of  a  negotiation  situation  is  the  bargaining  range  or 
surplus.
104 This is the area between the batnas of the parties, initially, or after the 
parties have improved their own and possibly deteriorated the other’s batna. In this 
area, both parties are better off by making a deal. In some negotiations, the batna for 
one  or  both  parties  is  very  unattractive.  They  may  be  tied  in  a  relationship,  for 
example,  an  employment  contract  or a  long-term  supply  arrangement  that  is  very 
costly to replace. In disputes, the costs of going to court are often so high, that it 
provides no realistic alternative to accepting a bad settlement offer or even to giving 
in.  
The size of the bargaining range is a two-sided coin. The upside is that the bigger the 
bargaining  surplus,  the  easier  it  will  be  for  the  parties  to  find  a  deal  that  is 
advantageous  for  both  parties  as  compared  with  their  respective  batnas.  The 
downside, however, is that they still have to divide the surplus, and the more there is 
to divide, the more difficult this will be. Consider settlement negotiations about a 
claim of 100,000 where the expected litigation costs for both parties are 30,000. If 
both parties agree the probability of the claim being successful is 40%, any outcome 
between 10,000 and 70,000 is inside the bargaining range, which comprises not less 
than 60% of the value to be distributed. Compare this to transactions like buying a car 
or construction of a house, where the bargaining range is usually a much smaller 
proportion  of the value to be distributed,  maybe something like  5 to  15%, which 
makes the distributive part of the negotiation much easier.  
In situations where the bargaining range is substantial in size, one party can take 
advantage of the other party by appropriating the better part of the bargaining range. 
Especially when one party has a relatively attractive batna, or is more inclined to take 
risks, there are opportunities for exploitation.
105 At worst, the more powerful party can 
then  take  all  of  the  bargaining  range.  Often,  in  situations  with  a  relatively  large 
bargaining range, the bargaining process may tend to degenerate to less cooperative 
levels because the parties will be more inclined to test each other on opportunities for 
exploitation. Resolving this distributive issue is the more difficult in view of the fact 
that  many  mechanisms  inherent  to  distributive  negotiations  prevent  them  from 
striking  a  fair  and  speedy  deal.  With  respect  to  the  exchange  of  offers  and 
concessions, research shows that negotiators do better when their opening offer is 
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more extreme, but such offers are likely to deteriorate the climate of the negotiation.
106 
In order  to induce concessions from  the  other party, they will also often have to 
commit themselves to courses of action such as going to court. These commitments 
are likely to be experienced as threats by the other party insofar they hurt that party’s 
interests.
107 Moreover, commitments sometimes have to be carried out in order to be 
credible.  Although  this  is  a  simplification,  these  processes  are  not  unfairly 
summarized as being a ‘contest of will.’
108  
2.  The Legal System as Batna Provider 
The legal system is a major provider of batnas. Indeed, providing people with better 
batnas can be seen as a one of its most important functions. Contract law, for instance, 
influences the information contracting parties give about the products or services they 
offer. Thus, it facilitates the finding of alternative bargains by lowering search costs. 
Competition law gives some indirect protection against market power by regulating 
monopolies, and sometimes even direct protection by regulating prices, if only by 
requiring a monopolist to charge a reasonable price.  
In  disputes,  the  legal  system  often  is  the  exclusive  provider  of  a  batna.
109  If  no 
negotiated agreement is reached, resolution by a court is the alternative, unless the 
parties jointly opted for another dispute resolution process, which then becomes their 
exclusive batna. This batna is built from several composite parts because it is the 
expected value of a court decision,
110 taking into account enforcement problems, less 
costs of litigation. Each of these component parts is in turn determined by the rules 
and practices of the legal system. Substantive rules influence the outcomes reflected 
in court decisions. Rules of procedure and practices among lawyers also have their 
impact on those outcomes. Moreover, they determine the possibilities of enforcement 
or the likelihood of reversal in appeal. The batna in a dispute also being determined 
by the costs of litigation, rules of civil procedure and practices among lawyers are 
again relevant.   
Thus, in negotiations about disputes, legal rules have their place as factors influencing 
batnas  rather  than  as commands  directly  determining  the  result  of a  court  action. 
When we add the openness and complexity of many rules, the batna available to a 
party in a dispute is frequently not a certain outcome, but a probability range of many 
different outcomes, that is difficult to determine. Moreover, each of these outcomes 
can only be reached at a cost, which tends to be substantial. Legal costs, opportunity 
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costs of time spent in the litigotiation process, and emotional costs often consume a 
considerable percentage of the value of the remedy made available by the legal rules. 
The bargaining situation is often even less satisfactory because the other party can 
influence these costs, and therefore the batna of a disputant. Being able to deteriorate 
the other party’s batna gives power in negotiations,
111 but it is a destructive kind of 
power. Use of it, or even threats to use it, easily leads to escalation, and at least to 
extra costs of dispute resolution. 
So,  the  legal  system,  although  providing  good  batnas  in  theory  for  less  powerful 
parties, often leaves them again at the mercy of the more powerful ones inside a huge 
bargaining range. Improving access to justice - reducing the size of the bargaining 
range by lowering the costs-component of batna’s - is not always easy. Sanctioning 
abuse  of  procedural  rules,  for  instance,  sometimes  helps,  but  may  also  lead  to 
procedural disputes and thus to new possibilities to deteriorate the other party’s batna, 
thus  again  expanding  the  bargaining  range  and  re-introducing  elements of  power, 
though not necessarily in the hands of the same parties. 
3.  Reducing the Bargaining Range: Access to Court and Protection Against 
Dominance 
Negotiation Theory assumes batnas in disputes are given and determined by the legal 
system, although the parties may be able to influence them within the confines of 
existing legal rules. If one of the major functions of the legal system is providing 
batnas, however, we might as well ask whether batnas can be improved from the 
perspective  of  supporting  a  negotiation  process  that  creates  maximum  value  and 
distributes value fairly. Proponents of a legal system that supports problem-solving 
negotiations would probably stress two things with respect to batnas.  
First, they would favour rules and practices that enable parties to assess their batnas. 
The legal system already stimulates the availability of some information about prices, 
qualities and risks of competing products, services or other assets, and it could do so 
more systematically, thereby reducing search costs. This approach could be extended 
from  deal  making  to  dispute  resolution.  Assessment  of  batnas  in  that  area  would 
become easier if court decisions were more predictable. Making it a professional duty 
of  lawyers  to  deliver  more  explicit  predictions  of  outcomes  and  risks  of  court 
proceedings, in percentages and distinguishing different possible courses of action, 
using  the  tools  of  decision  analysis,  could  be  one  way.
112  Procedures  for  joint 
assessments of the merits of cases during settlement conferences would be one of 
many other alternatives.
113 Because the expected costs of dispute resolution are also an 
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important factor determining the batna, making these more transparent would also be 
a good  thing. Again, lawyers  could  be made to deliver  more  explicit predictions, 
taking into account the cost consequences of countermeasures that can be expected 
from the other party. Lawyers could also be stimulated to use remuneration schemes 
that make the costs for the client more predictable, moving away from hourly fees and 
encouraging fixed fees, contingent fees or more sophisticated means of value-added 
billing.  Courts  could  help  to  make  dispute  resolution  costs  more  transparent  by 
establishing the route towards a final decision at an early stage of the proceedings. 
Secondly,  the  legal  system  could  try  to  provide  better  batnas,  so  that  bargaining 
ranges can decrease. Thus, it would give better protection against the exploitation that 
becomes more attractive to try when the bargaining range is too large in proportion to 
the value that has to be distributed. The best way this can be done in the regulation of 
transactions is probably by facilitating the provision of alternatives on the market. In 
general, keeping switching costs at reasonable levels seems to be a point of attention. 
Of course there is nothing new here, just giving extra reasons to improve market 
conditions through competition law and other necessary government interventions. 
Taking  the  perspective  that  negotiating  parties  have,  and  more  in  particular  the 
alternatives  they  have,  might  merely  be  a  tool  for  a  systematic  survey  of  market 
situations and of the usefulness of legal tools that are relevant in this respect.  
The main area of attention is disputes in which the parties are mostly tied to each 
other in a bilateral monopoly, and the legal system provides the only alternative to 
letting  the  other  party  win.    Let  us  summarize  where  we  are:  if  a  court,  or  a 
contractual  dispute  resolution  option,  is  not  accessible  at  a  reasonable  cost,  the 
bargaining  range  becomes  too  big,  the  rewards  of  exploitation  make  this  a  more 
attractive  option,  giving  it  a  try  may  become  irresistible  and  the  expectation  of 
attempts at exploitation might ruin the negotiation climate. Improving access to court 
is a constant concern of legislators, but only one among many. Moreover, it is under 
continuous pressure from the business interests of lawyers who try to increase their 
income from litigation and the negotiations preceding it. The view on the bargaining 
range offered by Negotiation Theory provides arguments to give access to court much 
more priority. It might even lead to the setting of targets for the maximum dispute 
resolution costs that would be acceptable in relation to the value to be distributed.   
The  batna of going to court, however, is not only  a matter of  costs. The general 
approach taken in court decisions is equally important. We have to remember that the 
parties not only distribute value by settling, but that they also can create value. If 
negotiations break down because the parties do not agree on the distribution of value, 
they may also lose the value they could create by finding integrative solutions for 
their interests. We saw that the law and practices of civil procedure could encourage 
value creation in settlements. We also discussed the rules regarding remedies, which 
could be much more attuned to value creation.
  114 Finally we noted the development 
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towards  decision  making  tailored  to  individual  circumstances  and  discussed  the 
possibility of letting courts decide on the basis of problem-solving principles. Taking 
this  line  of  thought  one  step  further,  we  now  have  an  extra  reason  to  let  court 
decisions reflect maximum value for the parties, choosing one option at the Pareto 
frontier.  The  way  courts  should  distribute  value,  for  instance  by  stipulating  the 
amount of compensation, could then still reflect the rules on distribution embodied in 
the  legal system. The value-creating elements could be protected by court orders, 
simulating the expected outcome of negotiations if they had succeeded based on the 
interests of the parties that were disclosed to the court.  
In  the  case  regarding  the  supply  of  memory  chips,  for  instance,  the  court  would 
choose an optimal combination of the elements of solutions provided by the parties, 
like  exchanging  personnel  or  test  results,  finding  other  sources  of  supply,  new 
procedures, apologies, or termination. Obviously, the passing of time would rule out 
some  alternatives,  but  the  court  would  still  maximize  value  from  the  remaining 
options. This would not only help the parties when they were unable to settle the case 
themselves with a decision that best serves their interests, it would also improve the 
climate for their settlement discussions. In such a setting, threats to go to court would 
only become threats to burden the other party with litigation costs, but not threats to 
take away the benefits of the deal. Batnas of negotiating parties would thus become 
better. Ideally, distributional bargaining would only be about distribution. The tension 
with value creation would to a large extent disappear. 
Letting courts preserve value creation would require a major change in the character 
of civil procedure. Courts would not just focus on enforcing obligations. They would 
be more like providers of dispute resolution help, intervening when the parties would 
not be able to reach an agreement on the distributional elements, deciding on these 
issues  for  them,  and  preserving,  or  even  increasing  the  value  created.
115  Court 
interventions would become a more attractive option, which might backfire into their 
caseload, thus endangering the prospect of improving access to court again. Courts 
providing problem-solving services instead of managing proceedings of a positional 
and adversarial character might, or might not be able to work at lower costs. More in 
general, the consequences of such an evolution are not easy to fathom. 
In some respects, civil procedure is already developing in this direction. By stressing 
settlement  as  a  worthwhile  outcome  and  by  providing  services  like  settlement 
conferences  and  court-annexed  mediation,  courts  gradually  become  facilitators  of 
negotiated outcomes.
116 Making adjudication itself a problem-solving process, at least 
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for some categories of disputes, can therefore also be seen as a natural next step in this 
development. 
If  courts  would  offer  facilitating  services  and,  in  case  the  parties  do  not  reach  a 
negotiated  outcome,  evaluate  against  objective  criteria,  the  debate  regarding 
facilitative or evaluative mediation becomes relevant.
117 Seen from the perspective of 
negotiating  disputants,  both  facilitation  and  evaluation  may  be  needed,  so  it  is 
probably a question of finding the right mix or sequence. The perspective of problem-
solving suggests that facilitation can be a first stage, that it can be extended into the 
stage where value is to be distributed
118 and that evaluation by a neutral can be a last 
resort.
119 Whether the same person (either a judge or another neutral decision maker) 
can supply both facilitation and evaluation is a difficult issue. Facilitating negotiations 
in  the  ‘shadow’  of  the  possibility  of  evaluation  may  cause  serious  problems. 
Introducing  another  person  with  other  perspectives  in  the  process  can  lead  to 
discontinuities, however. It is also a matter of facilitation and evaluation requiring 
different skills. Furthermore, making yet another person familiar with the case can be 
costly. It may be, however, that the gap between facilitation and evaluation turns out 
to be less wide in situations where the rules for evaluation are attuned to the interest-
based problem-solving negotiations between the parties. This brings us to the rules 
used by courts when they provide their evaluations.    
D.  Distribution: Objective Criteria 
1.  ‘Insist on using objective criteria’ 
As we have seen, the batnas of both parties determine the bargaining zone in which 
both parties can profit from the agreement. In many deals, the gains from cooperating 
are high in comparison to the batna. Parties are tied to each other in a relationship; 
running away comes at a very high price. Or the batna is going to court, which is so 
costly that it is not an appealing alternative. We saw that creating mechanisms that 
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decrease the gap between the batnas of the two parties can encourage cooperative 
solutions.  By  providing  better  batnas,  the  law  can  reduce  the  dependency  of  the 
parties on each other, making cooperation a real choice, instead of one forced upon a 
party by lack of realistic alternatives. Still, dividing the surplus to be obtained from an 
agreement is often a big problem in negotiations. Haggling, or worse, a contest of 
wills, is difficult to avoid.   
The theory of problem-solving negotiations, however, has one more guideline on offer 
to improve the process of dividing the bargaining range. It suggests to continue the 
joint search for a resolution of the problem from the value creation phase to the phase 
of the negotiations where the value has to be distributed. In particular, the parties 
should jointly search for objective criteria that could lead them towards a distribution 
that  is  acceptable  to  them  both.
120  Market  prices,  default  rules  or  commonly  used 
clauses could serve as objective criteria in transactions. In conflicts, the parties can 
borrow objective criteria from case law or from other sources.
 121   
Take a dispute between a factory owner and neighbors about a nuisance problem: 
radio music and other noise from trucks loading at the factory annoying the neighbors. 
Apart from value creation by honoring each other’s procedural and relational interests 
and by rescheduling loading activities to hours of the day where most of the neighbors 
are not at home, they may still have to determine the level of acceptable noise during 
day hours and during the early morning hours when undisturbed sleep is desirable. 
For  the  first  issue,  they  could  use  objective  criteria  like  regulations  or  practices 
regarding noise levels in houses in relation to various sources of noise, the noise 
originating from traffic or from commercial activities, for example. The resolution of 
the second issue could be inspired by rules or customs regarding night rest in other 
situations where people live close together, be it temporarily as in hotels, or more 
permanently.  
As the example shows, many different objective criteria can exist for one particular 
dispute. Another secret of modern dispute resolution is that no decision is needed on 
which criterion is the right one.
122  Various criteria can be applied  to the problem, 
rendering different outcomes. It is the pattern of these outcomes that gives the parties 
a better feeling about what is a reasonable solution. They can also see where their 
particular  circumstances  fit  in  this  wider  pattern.  If  most  of  the  neighbors  have 
sleeping  habits  differing  from  what  most  people  have,  this  can  be  a  reason  for 
adjustment of the outcome. 
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The  recommendation to use objective  criteria has been taken on  by critics  of the 
problem-solving  approach.
123  They  argue  that  the  parties  will  only  bring  forward 
objective criteria that support their positions. In a legal dispute, for instance, both 
parties will interpret the facts and turn them into arguments that support a claim or 
defense that would lead to a maximum outcome. Such one-sided objective criteria, 
like an extremely low or high price that was once paid for a similar car, are indeed 
similar to positions. But usually there are also more neutral criteria that parties may 
suggest as possibly useful, without translating them in a position. Suggesting criteria 
can be particularly effective when they reflect values the parties have. If a person 
tends to think in terms of efficiency or of rewarding effort, objective criteria based on 
these norms are likely to appeal to him.
124 
2.  Law and Objective Criteria 
When  transactions  are  being  concluded,  contract  law  helps  the  parties  to  find 
objective  criteria  for  distributive  issues,  but  mainly  in  an  indirect  manner:  rules 
providing incentives to disclose information may provide incentives for transparency 
of prices and the quality of products and services. These are prices and quality levels 
offered  by  individual  suppliers,  however.  The  legal  system  does  not  have  much 
influence  on  the  availability  of  information  regarding  price  and  quality  levels  in 
general.  This  is  left  to the  market  where  consumer  organizations  and  commercial 
information suppliers operate to provide such data and thus enhance consumer choice.  
What objective criteria are available for settling disputes? In one view, private law is 
full of objective criteria. Rules regarding contract formation, contract consequences, 
tortuous conduct and civil procedure are manifold. They are constantly being refined 
by court decisions, legal doctrine, and, occasionally, statutory law. In another view, 
the information all these rules give about the division of the pie is rather limited. Most 
of  them  are  rules  that  set  the  stage.  They  invite  courts  to  inquire  into  certain 
circumstances. For instance, the rules of contract law and tort law seldom give direct 
answers to questions of liability or quantum of damages, two of the most important 
issues that have to be determined in almost every legal dispute.
125(O Ben-Shahar 2002) 
Liability is determined in accordance with standards referring to ‘due care’ or ‘the 
meaning reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties would give to a contract in 
the same circumstances.’
126 The criteria for attribution of comparative negligence are 
very open-ended as well. The parties must hope for a published court decision about a 
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situation that closely resembles theirs. Such case law is sometimes not available. It 
may be difficult to determine which circumstances the court found decisive. Or there 
are many decisions, pointing in different directions. Moreover, the individualization 
of court decisions,
127 this tailoring to the individual circumstances of the parties that is 
so useful to in helping to let their individual interests be met, has also eroded the court 
system’s  capacity  to  deliver  rules  that  guide  parties  when  they  have  to  distribute 
value. 
Another structural problem is that many legal rules have a binary character.
128 They 
give ‘yes or no’ answers to questions of liability or preliminary issues that determine 
the outcome of court proceedings. These rules are less useful for parties looking for 
ways  to  divide  value  because  the  outcomes  that  the  rules  give  are  an  exclusive 
attribution of all the value to either one of the parties. In order to come to in-between 
solutions, the parties have to estimate the probability of both outcomes. Criteria that 
have a continuous character, or that at least render more outcomes than just a one or a 
zero, can directly support in between solutions.  
As in the area of transactions, the ‘market’ has found ways to provide useful objective 
criteria.  In  European  legal  systems,  schedules  for  the  calculation  of  damages  for 
personal injury are quite common.
129 Similarly, courts or arbitrators having to deal 
with labor disputes have developed formulas for the determination of compensation in 
case of dismissals. Interest groups have sometimes agreed on quality criteria for a 
whole industry, or these criteria can rather easily be derived from protocols indicating 
good practice, as the ones available for the medical profession. Still, for many types of 
disputes, it is not easy for the parties to find useful objective criteria. One of the 
problems here is that developing good objective criteria is costly, whereas they are 
public goods. Like other rules, they are non-rival in consumption and nonexclusive, 
causing free rider problems.
130 Courts, scholars, and even legislators must exert the 
effort,  bear  the  costs  and  are  exposed  to  criticism  when  they  develop  objective 
criteria, whereas their rewards are probably at best a better reputation for developing 
objective  criteria,  which  is  not  a  reputation  many  people  seem  to  strive  for.  The 
parties and lawyers that use objective criteria cannot easily be made to pay for the 
costs of developing them.   
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3.  The Objective Criteria Negotiators Need  
The providing of objective criteria for the distributive issues of common types of 
disputes is a neglected issue in debates about better dispute resolution.
 131 Scholars tend 
to concentrate  on the ways ADR  creates value  and overcomes barriers to dispute 
resolution. That the legal system provides rules which influence negotiations about 
disputes, directly as objective criteria and indirectly as determinants of batnas that 
have the form of court action, is taken for granted. Again, it is possible to reframe the 
issue and ask how  legal  criteria for distribution could  be tailored to the needs  of 
disputing parties.  
The literature on problem-solving gives some hints as to which objective criteria are 
helpful in settling disputes.
132 As we have seen, the criteria could be continuous, giving 
higher or lower outcomes, instead of providing ‘yes or no’ answers. For some legal 
issues that presently have a binary character, new rules could be introduced that allow 
for intermediary outcomes. A prominent example of such a change has of course been 
the  change  from  contributory  negligence  to  comparative  negligence.  In  most 
jurisdictions there are other examples of courts that have found ways to divide the pie 
instead of distributing it exclusively to one of the parties. Many jurisdictions now 
accept proportional liability in case of uncertainty regarding causation.
133  
There is more to say, however, about the kind of legal criteria that optimally help 
parties to divide value, whether it is contested property or damage. Ideally, the criteria 
will be applicable to both sides.
134 They should be practical, in the sense of not being 
too costly to apply, which will usually depend on the availability of information that is 
necessary  for  application.  As  we  will  see,  objective  criteria  would  preferably  not 
require an evaluation of the past conduct of the parties, because this is a burden for the 
negotiation process.
135 Where this cannot be avoided, it may at least be possible to stay 
away  from  references  to  intent,  which  put  even  more  stress  on  the  relationship 
between the parties and thus on the negotiation process.  
In contrast to what traditional legal thinking requires, there could be multiple criteria 
for one type of problem,
136 making the development of such criteria a much easier job. 
Various criteria would often yield different outcomes, but it could be left to the parties 
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to choose an outcome that matches the pattern obtained by applying the different 
criteria.
137 In this process, they could give criteria different weights, according to their 
plausibility and their fit to the problem at hand. Probably even courts could use this 
approach when they have to decide on the distributive issues if the parties do not 
reach an agreement.  
In this way, the legal system could also solve one of its most important paradoxes: 
wanting  to  be  general,  to  be  predictable,  and  to  give  tailor-made  outcomes  for 
individual  cases  at  the  same  time.  With  non-binding  general  rules,  guiding 
negotiations and decisions as objective criteria, tailoring the decision to the individual 
circumstances  is  still  possible.  This  can  be  achieved  by  creating  value  and  by 
adjusting distributional outcomes to the circumstances or letting them be inspired by 
other equally relevant objective criteria. Rules do not always have to bind the parties 
or the courts, but can be tools that help them to solve disputes. If they are not binding 
in the legal sense, but just valuable guidelines that parties and judges will usually take 
into account because of their inherent quality, they can be formulated in their usual 
general fashion. They do not have to be emptied of any informational content, like 
many present rules of private law, because this open- ended character is necessary to 
apply them to so many different circumstances. It can be left to the parties to adapt 
them to the circumstances of the case and, eventually, to the judge if the parties do not 
solve their dispute. Because rules are seen as tools, they can be more informative, and 
probably  even  bring  more  structure  and  equality  in  decision  making  than  can  be 
achieved  by the present system. For similar  reasons, the production  of such rules 
would be stimulated by letting them just have a guideline character. Courts, scholars, 
and even legislators can formulate them as general guidelines without having to worry 
about being bound by them in unforeseen situations in which the rules would lead to 
unacceptable  results.  Their  application  in  concrete  circumstances  would  be  the 
responsibility of the parties and the judge in that particular situation.
138 
Although this may be an interesting approach, many objections will have to be dealt 
with.  Such  a  changed  attitude  towards  at  least  some  of  the  rules  of  private  law 
presupposes courts capable of collecting suitable criteria and trustworthy in applying 
them  in  an  unbiased  manner.
139  It  also  requires  a  basic  understanding  of  what 
constitute suitable objective criteria between the parties and the court. Mechanisms 
that  make  courts  accountable  for  outcomes,  from  the  way  they  give  reasons  for 
decisions to appeal procedures, may have to be revised or even reinvented. 
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E.  Process Technology 
1.  ‘Separate the people from the problem’ 
We have now discussed four basic elements of problem-solving negotiations: interest 
based,  generation  of many  ‘value-maximizing’  solutions,  evaluation against batna, 
and distribution in accordance with objective criteria. The next three elements relate 
to the processes that  are  needed to  make problem-solving  negotiations  work. The 
present chapter first discusses the communication between the parties.  
In order to determine the interests, parties following the problem-solving method have 
to listen carefully to the other person and to express their own interests equally well.
140 
This is ‘audi et alterem partem’ in the more sophisticated version of empathy and 
assertiveness. The parties may experience serious difficulties when trying to find out 
what the other party’s interests are and even when discovering what they themselves 
prefer.  People  often  only  become  aware  of  their  real  preferences  during  the 
negotiations about a transaction. Indeed, service providers like doctors, management 
consultants,  or  lawyers,  as  well  as  many  sellers  of  tailor-made  products  spend 
considerable time helping their customers to discover their needs and preferences. 
Ignorance about one’s interests or inability to express them may even lie at the root of 
the failure of parties to solve a dispute themselves.  
Jointly developing solutions for mutual gain presupposes communication about, and 
understanding of, both your own and the other’s interests, as well as a willingness to 
consider solutions that help both parties advance their interests. In order to evaluate a 
batna, the parties have to be able to catalogue interests, rank them or even rate them, 
explicitly,  or  at  least  intuitively.  Applying  objective  criteria  also  requires  good 
communication skills. All these processes, although some might call them basic life 
skills, are difficult enough. Often they are complicated by emotions, worries about the 
unknowns of the transaction, excitement about the new opportunities, irritation in a 
dispute, or the grief related to a loss that has to be coped with.
141 In addition, there is a 
range of cognitive errors that plague people when they negotiate.
142 Strategic conduct, 
maneuvering  aimed  at  obtaining  the  best  outcome  for  oneself,  at  the  expense  of 
others, results in another sets of barriers to resolution of a conflict of interests.  
These pitfalls of negotiation, and the techniques to avoid them, are so important that 
most handbooks on negotiation start here.
143 Communication is essential, and if it does 
not work it has to be restored before the parties can get to the substance of the deal or 
the  conflict.  ‘Separating  the  problem  from  the  people’  is  tantamount  to 
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communication techniques that intend to enable the parties to follow the four basic 
steps of the problem-solving procedure, to cope with their emotions and to overcome 
the  other  barriers  to  finding  a  solution  for  the  negotiation  problem.  A  whole 
‘technology’ has developed to get and keep them going. This technology facilitates 
the process and puts it back on track when barriers are encountered on the way. Some 
of  these  facilitating  techniques  are:  active  listening,  probing,  different  types  of 
questioning, rephrasing, summarizing, brainstorming about solutions, and methods for 
evaluation of batnas.
144 Empowerment, the feeling of the parties that they can cope 
with the situation, and recognition, their ability to see the situation of the other party, 
are  objectives  that  may  guide  the  use  of  these  techniques.
145  They  can  also  be 
interpreted as targets for creation of a situation in which the parties are ready to think 
and talk about solutions that are appropriate for their interests. If they are empowered 
and can give recognition, they will be more fully able to explore and evaluate possible 
outcomes of the negotiation, be it an agreement or a reasoned choice for their best 
alternative.  Interestingly,  most  of  these  techniques  can  be  learned  and  applied  by 
negotiating  parties,  as  well  as  by  third  parties  facilitating  negotiation  processes, 
although both self-help and third-party intervention may have advantages in some 
situations. 
When using the word technology, I am not suggesting that these methods are easily 
learned or applied. I fully appreciate the difficulties of using them and of using the 
right tool at the right moment, which probably is not possible unless these techniques 
have been internalized to such extent that it would be more appropriate to talk of an 
attitude rather than a technique. Moreover, different techniques compete and imply 
different views on human interests, on conflict, or on the way differences should be 
resolved. The word technology, however, rightly expresses that methods facilitating 
conflict  resolution  have  been  developed  that  are  explicit,  reproducible,  and 
empirically testable.
146 And although the methods differ, they seem to have a common 
core that is sound enough to build on. 
A point worth noting is that most of the communication methods incorporated in the 
problem-solving  method  are  widely  used  outside  the  realm  of  transactions  and 
disputes covered by the legal system. They are methods of interaction that are relevant 
for  every  negotiation  and,  depending  on  what  you  still  call  negotiation,  for  most 
dealings with other people in general. Many elements of it are also used wherever 
people need to be managed or have to work in a team within an organization. Active 
listening  skills,  techniques  for  finding  optimal  solutions  in  terms  of  interests  and 
competences to evaluate options are not only part of standard management methods, 
but  are  also  important  elements  of  services  offered  by  the  helping  professions. 
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Coaches and therapists also use them. This suggests that a development of the legal 
system in the direction of problem-solving would not be an isolated exercise. Such an 
approach could bring legal services probably more in line with the service models 
employed successfully by other advising or helping professions, and, perhaps, with 
the daily experiences of clients and their beliefs about proper cooperation.
147 
2.  Legal Communication  
There  is  already  much  literature  explaining  that  the  legal  system  regulating 
transactions  and  disputes  entails  many  elements  that  conflict  with  this  emerging 
communication  technology  that  supports  negotiations  and,  more  in  general, 
cooperation.
148  The  rules  and  practices  of  the  legal  system  restrict  communication 
channels,  encourage  an  exchange  of  positions,  and  concentrate  on  substantive 
interests.  
This is less so in the area of transactions, where the legal rules have not much to say 
regarding the way the parties should communicate. Still, the practices of contract 
negotiation  are  rather  formal.  Once  the  parties  have  determined  the  commercial 
fundamentals  of  the  transaction,  the  negotiation  process  is  often  taken  over  by 
lawyers. Then, many of the contacts between the parties will be in writing, which 
serves  the  useful  goal  of  making  it  transparent  for  all  parties  involved.  But 
information in writing makes people cautious; misunderstandings and beliefs about 
intentions cannot easily be checked. Moreover, the negotiation process often has the 
form of an exchange of draft contracts and comments on them, a procedure which 
invites positional bargaining and may inhibit a search for creative solutions.  
Arguably,  the  gap  between  modern  dispute  resolution  techniques  and  the  dispute 
resolution  services  the  legal  system  provides  is  much  larger.  Pre-trial  dispute 
resolution  is  even  more  entrusted  to  lawyers,  restricting  direct  communication 
between  the  parties,  and  formalizing  it.  The  legal  system,  with  its  catalogues  of 
available remedies and its requirements regarding concrete claims as entry conditions 
to court intervention, fosters the positional bargaining tendencies many parties in a 
dispute already have. Emotions and barriers to conflict resolution get no systematic 
attention in civil procedure rules or practices. The system focuses on communication 
regarding facts and arguments that support claims or defenses. Using techniques like 
probing, asking questions, or active listening is not impossible in these settings, but is 
much less likely to be successful.  
Transaction practice and dispute resolution practice alike are developing into new 
directions where it is much easier to use the techniques of problem-solving. Many 
transaction lawyers now use problem-solving skills, at least when negotiations along 
traditional lines bog down. Civil procedure rules and practices have been changed 
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during the past decades almost everywhere in the direction of fewer formalities and 
more stages where the parties meet in person. Settlement has been upgraded from an 
implied objective of civil procedure to an explicit one, opening the door for use of the 
techniques that are suitable for this. Pre trial information exchange is organized in 
new  ways,  that  are  easier  to  reconcile  with  modern  communication  methods.
149 
Mediation,  in  which  this  technology  is  commonly  used,  is  considered  by  many 
disputants, and  even  tried  by  an  increasing  percentage,  sometimes  under  pressure 
from courts, or even as a precondition for access to those courts.
150 
3.  Increasing Process Awareness in the Legal System 
Although  these  developments  are  encouraging,  and  the  positive  attitude  towards 
experimentation that comes with them is a good thing in itself, they still take place in 
an environment that is designed and built on foundations that are partly inconsistent 
with using the communication techniques of modern dispute resolution. Moreover, the 
use of negotiation technology within this environment still depends on choices made 
by  individual  lawyers,  judges,  or  other  dispute  resolution  professionals.  Legal 
negotiations are a multi-party  game, however, with parties themselves, backed  by 
other stakeholders, lawyers, and third parties.
151 If the persons concerned do not all 
agree on one procedure and its accompanying communication methods, which will 
often be the case, especially in disputes, they are likely to be stuck with the default: 
the method of communication that is implicit in the conventional system that has been 
developed  in  many  centuries.  These  default  methods  of  negotiation  and 
communication are determined by the legal system, and by the common practices of 
lawyers,  such  as  the  usual  ways  of  processing  documents  when  doing  a  merger 
transaction. The road to real change, therefore, is probably the adjustment of these 
default procedures: that is changing the formal rules of the legal system or explicitly 
and wholeheartedly introducing new practices that are likely to be followed by such a 
majority of persons involved that they stand a chance of becoming a new default.    
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Transaction  lawyers may be able to  develop templates for  negotiating deals, with 
modern negotiation technology built in. Many companies already have procedures for 
dealing with differences in relations with employees, customers, suppliers, or even 
shareholders. These procedures, which probably already reflect the problem-solving 
method or its equivalents from management theory, could be further extended into the 
realm of legal dispute resolution.  
Civil  procedure  rules  and  court  or  arbitration  practices  could  also  be  adjusted  to 
accommodate modern dispute resolution techniques. If court hearings entailed more 
elements of the problem-solving method, the associated communication techniques 
could become standard tools that everyone present at the hearing could expect the 
judges and lawyers to use. Protocols for dealing with certain disputes could explicitly 
encourage the parties and their lawyers to make use of these skills. Mastering such 
skills could be a requirement for access to the legal profession. Assessing the way 
they are used could become an element of evaluation of dispute resolution efforts, 
stimulating learning by doing and reflecting on experiences.  
F.  Blame 
1.  ‘Avoid Blame, Look For Contribution.’ 
A topic that deserves separate treatment is blame, because it is so central in the legal 
system.
152  Assigning  blame  is  a  natural  urge  of  people  when  confronted  with  a 
negative  outcome.  People  generally  favor  human  agency  explanations  while  de-
emphasizing  evidence  of  mitigating  circumstances.
153  In  theory,  it  is  possible  to 
distinguish different levels of attribution to other persons.
154 A person’s conduct can be 
just the cause of some event, this person can be responsible for it, the person can have 
acted  morally  blameworthy,  and,  finally,  the  conduct  can  be  extra  objectionable 
because  the  act  was  intentional.  In  practice,  these  distinctions  are  easily  blurred, 
especially when the attribution is linked to sanctions, which people tend to see as a 
reaction coupled to conduct that is morally blameworthy. 
Blame can be seen as an emotional outlet for hurt feelings that are difficult to express 
directly.
155 Blame is thus likely to be a sort of proxy for underlying interests: needs, 
wishes, and, more in particular, concerns or fears. Indeed, mediators often use views 
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of the parties expressing blame as the starting-point for their search for underlying 
interests. What may also trigger blame is the fear of being blamed; it might be a 
defensive reaction. That  may  be one of the reasons why blame is so common in 
disputes. It probably occurs less frequently in negotiations about transactions. Even 
there, blame comes up easily when the negotiations stall. 
Blame has important functions.
156 It can be an effective teaching tool that helps people 
avoid repeating their mistakes. It can also be used to stimulate people to put forth their 
best  efforts.  However,  it  has  many  disadvantages  as  well.  First,  spontaneous 
attributions of blame are notorious for being influenced by factors like emotional state 
of mind, unfavorable attitudes towards the actor, towards other acts of his, or towards 
the group to which he belongs, severity of outcome and a tendency to see people 
rather than the environment as causes.
157 
Blaming also affects the way people deal with a problem in negotiations. Confidence 
may be a casualty of blame,
  and this seems to be at odds with empowerment, an 
important condition for moving forward in negotiations. In their convincing treatment 
of the impact of blame on how people deal with differences, Stone, Patton & Heen 
state that blaming stands in the way of learning what really is the problem and what 
can be done about it. It is hard to talk about because it necessarily implies a discussion 
in  terms  of  actions  that  caused  the  problem,  evaluation  of  these  actions  against 
standards of conduct, and sanctioning. Blaming implies bad conduct and punishment. 
Therefore, it invites defensiveness, strong emotions, and arguments, everything that 
comes with the role of the accused.
158 People who are blamed are less likely to be 
understanding, open, and willing to apologize. They are less interested in finding out 
the truth about what happened and may even obstruct it.
159 Distributing responsibility 
to one or more persons also requires an analysis of individual conduct and invites 
remedying the situation by sanctioning this conduct. Often it is more fruitful to look at 
the wider system in which the problem arose and to stimulate changes in the system: 
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the relationship between the people, the surrounding technology, or other elements of 
the  wider  setting.
160  By  inducing  defensive  reactions,  strong  emotions,  and 
counterattacks, blame puts stress on relationships. More in general blame is backward 
looking and not forward looking, where things can still be changed for the better. 
If this is a fair account of the effects of blaming, it is likely to complicate problem-
solving negotiations. It adds strain to the relationship between the parties. In some 
respects, it is even the opposite of what people should be stimulated to do when they 
have differences.
161 Blaming inhibits listening to the other party and understanding that 
person’s interests.
162 Because the focus is on the conduct of the other, the blaming 
party easily loses sight of his or her own interests and of possible solutions. On the 
other side, it causes defensive reactions that again inhibit the ability to see underlying 
interests and possible solutions. It can also be unfair. Being accused of having acted 
wrongly is one thing when there was a clear rule that was transgressed. In many 
disputes, however, it is almost impossible for one party to say that the whole problem 
was caused by the other party’s wrongful conduct. What conduct could be expected 
was  not  at  all  clear,  or  the  duties  that  were  not  lived  up  to  were  of  only  minor 
significance. Blaming also  invites counterattacks  based on  blame,  making it more 
likely that a victim is blamed as well. 
This is why proponents of the problem-solving method tell us to avoid the blame 
frame. When parties start to blame one another, the reaction should be to rephrase the 
blaming issue as an issue of interests.
163 They advise us to reserve the blame frame for 
situations where distributing responsibility to one or more persons by an analysis of 
individual  conduct,  and  remedying  the  situation  by  sanctioning  this  conduct  is 
necessary  or  the  preferable  way  of  dealing  with  a  problem,  even  when  all  the 
drawbacks of using the blame frame are taken into account.
164 
2.  The Blame Standard  
The legal system often uses the framework of defining an obligation or duty, checking 
whether  it  is  performed,  and  sanctioning  when  it  is  not.  Most  of  the  time,  these 
obligations and duties reflect standards of conduct. Defining and enforcing rules of 
conduct is the essence of contract law and tort law. In both areas, strict liabilities, 
where responsibility is independent of conduct, are the exception; even when strict 
liabilities are invoked standards of conduct can still be relevant as they reappear in the 
guise of defenses. The law of civil procedure also mainly consists of rules of conduct.  
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In addition to this  primary level  of conduct rules, contract law and  tort  law give 
procedural rules for some issues that are hard to deal with by substantive rules: notice 
requirements may relate to the way parties communicate about non-performance, for 
instance. Many disputes about substantive issues, therefore, give rise to secondary 
disputes  of  a  procedural  nature,  and  even  third-  or  fourth-  order  disputes  are  not 
uncommon. The discussion might unfold like this: If a person could not actively have 
prevented  the  damage  on  the  spot,  he  could  have  anticipated  it  and  have  taken 
precautionary measures. If he was not in the position to take such measures, he could 
have made another person to do it. If he had no authority over this person, he could 
have alerted this other person. If he did not have the information that was necessary to 
anticipate the event, he should have informed himself better. If he does not remember 
correctly which information he had at which moment, he may be caught not telling the 
truth, or identified as someone who does not properly records information. Although 
there are many exceptions, the typical way a dispute is processed by the legal system 
is thus that a standard of conduct is found, a person is accused of not living up to this 
standard, and the remedy the legal system provides is translated into a claim.  
This  framework  of  standard  of  conduct,  blaming,  and  claiming  has  obvious 
advantages. Legal sanctions are indispensable for the prevention of many forms of 
unwanted conduct. Blame and the related concept of guilt are sanctions in themselves 
that contribute to prevention.
165 If nobody could ever be blamed and sanctioned for not 
living up to obligations, the economy and society at large would cease to function. 
These  sanctions  are  not  only  necessary  for  prevention,  but  the  principle  that  the 
resulting  damage  should  also  be  rectified  is  a  straightforward  method  to  decide 
whether the victims of harmful conduct should be provided with compensation.  
For many obligations, the framework of standard of conduct, blaming and claiming is 
not only indispensable, but also relatively unproblematic. A debtor not paying back a 
loan at the agreed time, a supplier of clearly defective goods, or a reckless driver 
causing an accident should be corrected, and an invitation to live up to his obligations 
is what he can expect. The framework is more troublesome, however, in situations in 
which the obligations of the parties are not as clearly defined or where it is doubtful 
whether they have lived up to the relevant standards of conduct. In many disputes, 
lawyers have to more or less create the standards of conduct. They ‘derive’ them from 
ambiguous sources, such as when they construe a term as implied in a contract or 
extract a more concrete duty from a very general doctrine such as negligence. In these 
situations, the emotions, defensiveness, and other common reactions associated with 
being blamed, are likely to be even stronger.  
For lawyers, creating duties, blaming, and claiming are normal tools. They know that 
the  three  levels  of  blame,  mere  causation,  legal  responsibility,  and  being  morally 
blameworthy, should be distinguished. They know that blaming is mostly a way of 
attributing damage, and not a moral condemnation. They know that what the law 
requires  of  individuals  is  often  not  realistic  in real  life.  They  also  know  that  not 
observing duties is frequent and human. Lawyers may soften the impact of blaming 
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on their clients by telling them this game is part of the legal process, and that legal 
blame should not be taken for real moral blame. But for the clients, the game is bound 
to be reality. They are the ones who are being blamed. They are being threatened with 
sanctions for their alleged misconduct. Moreover, in many situations, lawyers play a 
more serious version of the blame game. Lawyers often blow up the accusations that 
are only ‘legal’ into ‘real’ ones in order to increase their chances of prevailing in 
courts.
166 Courts will presumably have less difficulties to decide that a person is liable, 
and especially for extensive consequences, when there is someone really to blame. So 
lawyers sometimes do try to convert ‘legal blame’ into ‘real blame’. In some contexts, 
they even have incentives to label harmful conduct as intentional. When that is done, 
dispute resolution is likely to become even more difficult. Bad intent suggests bad 
character
167 and when the debate changes into one about character, it will cause yet 
more defensiveness, making the empowerment and recognition that are necessary for 
effective negotiations even more difficult to achieve. Moreover, in a dispute in which 
one is already inclined to see the other as an adversary, attributions like intent can 
easily become self-fulfilling.  
3.  Alternatives for the Blame Frame 
The blaming framework, though it seems to cause substantial costs, appears to be an 
essential element of the way the legal system operates. Is this where the problem-
solving method runs out of steam? Or, in other words, is the tendency of the legal 
system to promote blaming a necessary and unalterable element of this system? Let us 
explore some ways the legal system could cope with this controversial element.   
It  may  be  useful  to  start  with  restating  that  responsibility  and  sanctions  are 
indispensable elements of the legal system when its goal is to prevent undesirable 
conduct. Prevention by the legal system is hardly thinkable without many standards of 
conduct and sanctions. Blaming may also indirectly serve that other goal of private 
law, compensation. Determining who has caused damage through improper conduct is 
also a way to distribute value.
168 The amount of blame on both parties provides us with 
an objective criterion. The social norm
169 or moral heuristic
170 that says that damage 
caused  by  improper  conduct  should  be  compensated  is  so  powerful  because  it  is 
apparently  a  nice  fit  to  both  primary  goals  of  private  law,  prevention  and 
compensation (optimal distribution). This also explains why it is so difficult to find 
alternatives for the framework of duties, blaming and claiming. Alternatives may only 
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be a substitute for blaming with respect to one of the goals, and may have to be 
supplemented by other alternatives that substitute the other goal. In the following, I 
will not engage in a full-scale discussion of alternatives for the present system. Rather 
I will focus on some alternative approaches that could be inspired by the problem-
solving method. I will not discuss other valuable tools for prevention like reputation, 
social norms or other non-legal incentives, and alternative compensation instruments 
like strict liability, government and private funds, or social security.    
We might try to do something about the procedural and relational consequences of 
blaming by considering alternative methods of communication. For instance, we may 
wonder whether the goal of prevention really requires that other persons express that 
the wrongdoer has not lived up to the standard and that a sanction should follow. 
Some of the negative side effects of blaming might be mitigated when an answerable 
person is given the chance  to make  up his own mind about responsibility and to 
express his views first, before he is hit by an accusation. When there is a sufficiently 
clear standard of conduct, like an agreement that payment is due on a certain date, or a 
safety rule, it may be sufficient to inform him of the harm experienced and ask him 
what  his  ideas  are  about  dealing  with  this  situation,  in  relation  to  the  reasonable 
expectations that the harmed person has on the basis of the contractual relationship.
171 
The other party will generally be able to link the harm to the standard of conduct 
himself. Evasive answers can be met by follow-up questions. If necessary, a more 
responsible reaction can be triggered when the person experiencing a problem with 
the conduct of another specifies the conduct he expected, leaving open whether this 
expectation was realistic or right. If no responsibility is taken then, and it should be, it 
is  probably  early  enough  for  a  formal  accusation.  Such  alternative  manners  of 
communication are likely to lower the costs of discussing responsibility, enabling a 
more  thorough  evaluation  of  possible  causes  and  remedies  and  thus  improving 
learning. Hence, this would be an advisable way forward, unless these cost savings 
and  effects  on  prevention  would  be  offset  by  positive  contributions  of  the  act  of 
blaming. Is, for instance, the threat of being blamed an effective extra sanctioning 
element that inspires people even more to live up to their obligations?
172 
The blame frame is probably the most problematic in disputes in which the parties 
have not contravened clear standards of conduct that they reasonably could have been 
aware of or in which they had reasonable grounds to believe that the standards would 
not apply in the circumstances.
173 We saw that lawyers often have to ‘create’ standards 
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afterwards,
174 with the benefits and errors that come with hindsight, particularly when 
they want to obtain a more favorable distribution of value for their clients. In these 
situations,  the  legal  system  actively  transforms  the  dispute  into  a  blaming  game. 
Prevention might still be relevant in these situations, in the sense that the general 
possibility of being blamed invites people to think about the effects of their actions on 
others. But for the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph, blaming in these 
situations can also be extra harmful and even plainly unfair.  
The goal of prevention would probably not suffer in these ambiguous situations if the 
parties  discussed  the  things  that  went  wrong  in  terms  of  contribution  instead  of 
blame.
175  Mapping  the  contribution  system,  the  possible  causes  of  the  adverse 
outcome, avoids many of the side effects of blaming. It might enhance prevention 
whenever it leads to considering more possible causes, including those explanations 
that reside in the interaction between people, rather than in individual conduct, or the 
ones  from  external  factors.  Another  way  of  reinterpreting  blame  is  the  ‘Personal 
Control Model’ that centers on the freedom to effect outcomes and the constraints on 
this  freedom,  like  physical,  cognitive,  emotional,  and  situational  constraints  or 
competing causal factors.
176 In this approach, the amount of control can be established, 
and responsibility can become a gradual matter, instead of an all-or-nothing issue. 
This is likely to make the approach less threatening for the actor
  and less damaging to 
the negotiation process, although the differences between this approach and the usual 
blaming  approach  may  be  subtle,  making  degeneration  into  the  latter  approach 
conceivable. 
When compensation, that is, value distribution, is the goal, these alternatives may also 
be  useful.  Contribution  or  personal  control  versions  of  responsibility,  with  their 
gradations  of  contribution  or  perceived  control,  can  be  translated  into  suitable 
objective criteria, which, as we saw, are preferably of a continuous and two-sided 
nature.
177  However,  for  distribution  purposes,  objective  criteria  can  be  used  that 
distance themselves even further from the evaluation of conduct. Such alternatives are 
already  present  in  the  legal  system.  Although  largely  unnoticed  by  mainstream 
academics and lawyers, many subdivisions of private law are indeed in the process of 
developing criteria that withdraw from the blame frame. In divorce law, and in the 
wider area of family law, many jurisdictions have adopted rules that deal with issues 
like financial support or custody on the basis of future needs, personal skills or other 
resources. In some countries, wrongful dismissal laws take the form of schedules for 
compensation of workers that take into account factors like age and years with the 
company, factors that are a good proxy for the relation specific investments made by 
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the  worker,  the  way  in  which  investments  like  specific  skills  and  dedication 
contributed  to  the  activities  of  the  employer,  and  the  future  employability  of  the 
employee. In these systems, an employee can be dismissed for almost any reason and 
reasons are only marginally examined. By still allowing compensation in these cases, 
they are different from systems in which rules of conduct have to be deduced from 
doctrines like discrimination or good faith in order to obtain access to compensation. 
Could these developments lead to identification of blame-free areas in the law? Areas 
where  referring  to  standards  of  conduct  is  not  the  normal  way  of  dealing  with 
differences, but an exception, for which special reasons have to be invoked? Areas 
where blaming is actively discouraged by the dispute resolution professionals that 
reside in it and their practices?   
G.  Cooperation 
1.  ‘Be cooperative, and do not overestimate your autonomy.’ 
Negotiation  research  has  also  identified  less  tangible  factors  that  contribute  to 
favorable  outcomes  of  negotiations  according  to  the  integrative  method.
178  Other 
factors are thought to inhibit problem-solving.
179 Some of these factors can easily be 
linked to topics already discussed, like ‘Faith in one’s problem-solving ability’ and ‘A 
belief in the validity of one’s own position and the other’s perspective’, which are 
very close to empowerment and recognition.
180 The other factors also sound familiar. 
The importance of ‘Some common objective or goal’ is easily understandable because 
the problem-solving method loses much of its attraction when the interests of the 
parties are totally opposed, and the gains of the method will increase when there is a 
joined  perspective.  ‘Motivation  and  commitment  to  work  together’  obviously 
contribute to better communication and overcoming of barriers to dispute resolution. 
‘Trust’ helps people to be open about their interests, about possible solutions, and 
about  their  batnas.  These  latter  factors  are  also  related  in  one  way  or  another, 
however, to autonomy and cooperation, the subject of this chapter. 
The essence of problem-solving is that it is a cooperative process linking autonomous 
parties. Their autonomy resides in the formulation of their own interests and the way 
they value these, as well as in their freedom to choose between various outcomes, 
whether  they  are options generated in  the  negotiations  or alternatives available to 
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them outside the negotiation arena. The other elements of the problem-solving method 
are a matter of cooperation, however. The parties are told to communicate about their 
interests, to search for value-creating solutions together, to jointly collect relevant 
objective criteria, and to communicate again about ways to resolve impasses. They are 
even advised to assist each other with uncovering interests and evaluating batnas, in 
particular when the negotiations stall.
181 This is not to say that cooperation is always 
easy, or even possible. A factor that may inhibit cooperation is a relationship that ties 
the parties together because they have no viable alternatives.
182 Although a relationship 
is thus a standing invitation to cooperate, it may be loaded with negative experiences 
from the past. One or both parties may find it difficult to believe that the other now 
genuinely  wants  cooperation  or  that  cooperation  would  stick,  if  tried.  However 
difficult it may sometimes be, cooperation is still a very important underpinning of 
problem-solving.  
2.  Autonomy 
The system of private law is built on autonomy. Both in contract law and in the law of 
civil procedure, the traditional view is that each party determines its own strategy, 
independent of the other party. Where cooperation is deemed necessary, the freedom 
to act is restrained by rules of conduct and sanctions, which change the expected 
outcomes for the parties and give them incentives to cooperate. We saw that this is in 
line with the dominant approach of economics that also tries to influence individual 
choice through incentives and hopes to induce cooperation in this manner.
183  
Autonomy is an immensely important principle. It supports choice and each person’s 
pursuit of its own interests, which is a powerful drive to create value, individually, or 
through  concerted  action  with  others.  It  can  hardly  be  the  overarching  principle, 
however, in more complex contractual dealings in which the parties have to interact 
intensively  in  an  environment  of  changing  and  developing  interests,  preferences, 
feasible solutions, and external circumstances. Coping with these countless and ever 
changing-components  by  a  series  of  autonomous  decisions  by  individual  parties, 
where the expected follow-up decisions of the other party are just another class of 
contingencies,  may  not  be  the  most  efficient  approach.  Still,  this  is  the  kind  of 
interaction contract law assumes, with its rules that enable the parties to choose their 
positions  or  remedies  within  the  margins  set  by  these  rules.  Sometimes  the  rules 
stimulate cooperation because they require the parties to take some of the interests of 
the other party into account, like the doctrine of good faith.
184 However, the interests of 
the parties, and the ways the interests of both parties should be maximized, differ 
                                                 
181 William Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating with Difficult People (Bantam Books, New York, 1991). 
182 Roy J. Lewicki, David M. Saunders and John W. Minton, Negotiation (3rd ed., Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 
Boston, 1999) 269-275. 
183 See Chapter I.C. 
184 See Thomas A. Diamond and Howard Foss, ’Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery’ (1996) 
47 Hastings Law Journal 585 for a useful overview of the categories of situations in which the doctrine 
of ‘good faith’ imposes such a duty.   56 
from case to case and are not even fully known by the parties themselves, unless they 
cooperate. So rules forcing parties to take some interests into account will either be 
too lenient for many situations where they do not create maximum value, or overshoot 
in many other situations where they unnecessarily restrict freedom of choice.  
The rules of contract law thus give an impression of autonomy, whereas a successful 
contractual  cooperation  is  often  only  possible  through  cooperation.  Certainly, 
cooperation  is  practicable  within  the  architecture  provided  by  contract  law.  Its 
structure is just not very supportive, and sometimes even at odds with the conditions 
for  optimal  value  creation  through  cooperative  processes  like  problem-solving. 
Stressing autonomy and individualistic party choice is not the most appropriate way to 
foster a collaborative relationship. The dichotomy of obligations that parties assume 
towards each other is not easy to reconcile with a ‘Common objective or goal’ that is 
so essential for a cooperative venture. There is little in a handbook on contract law 
that inspires ‘Motivation and commitment to work together’. And how exactly does 
contract law create or support ‘Trust’? Could it do more to build trust than providing 
enforcement of assumed obligations so that certain relation-specific investments can 
be protected?
185    
This inordinate stress on autonomy is even more problematic in disputes. In dispute 
resolution, the autonomy that is implied in the basic rules of civil procedure law not 
only discourages cooperation, but is even likely to generate escalation. Each party 
determines its own strategy. Litigation, as it has developed in practice, is far from a 
cooperative process. The ground rule of the game is to get the other party doing what 
one wants, by requests and claims backed up by threats and commitments. Threats 
occasionally have to be carried out. Commitments should be lived up to in order to be 
credible.  Moreover,  threats  and  commitments  may  lead  to  escalation.  When  you 
actually impose sanctions on the other party, it is unlikely that you will still be seen as 
a negotiating partner in a relationship that both parties see as collaborative, with a 
common goal, wherein the parties are motivated to cooperate, and in which they trust 
each  other.  Finally,  the  legal  system  induces  the  parties  to  see  issues  as  being 
distributive: taking positions and finding a compromise between them is what the law 
of civil procedure suggests. 
Although few disputes end up in court, many more of them go through one or more 
preparatory  steps.  Consequently,  the  negotiations  preceding  and  accompanying 
litigation are likely to be permeated by the beliefs and practices underlying litigation. 
Lawyers send out letters summarizing the position they will take in a court case and 
threaten with concrete steps to move towards a court decision. Draft writs are shown 
to the other party in order to negotiate from a strong position. Information is gathered 
by procedures like discovery. Assets that are the subject of the dispute may be frozen. 
The problem with all these steps is that they not only serve the legitimate interests of 
the parties in improving their position in a court action, but also seriously damage the 
other party. Claims issued by lawyers, even if just formulated in a letter, invoke a 
range of internal measures to be taken by the defendant: informing lawyers, collecting 
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evidence, and informing shareholders or other interested parties like banks, spouses, 
other  relatives, and  auditors. Answering a discovery request is costly. When  your 
assets are frozen, they are worth less than when you can dispose of them freely. All 
these steps are not only an invitation to take costly damage-limiting measures, but 
also to react in a ‘tit for tat’ manner, so that yet other costs are made.  
We still do not know whether some degree of escalation is sometimes a useful phase 
in dispute resolution. But it is likely that higher degrees of escalation will lead to 
higher costs of dispute resolution. And it is very unlikely that a relationship affected 
by the attitudes and rules of litigation can at the same time be collaborative and full of 
trust. Being able to simultaneously play two games that are so different in essence, in 
a dispute situation that is already characterized by a loss of control, seems to require 
almost superhuman capabilities.
186 Clients do not usually possess these, nor will many 
lawyers. This is reflected in recommendations to hire not only a litigator but also a 
specialized ‘settlement counsel.
187 As long as the legal system and the efficiency of 
negotiations put different challenges to disputants, they will have to cope, but many of 
them will long for more coherence between the legal system and the requirements of 
efficient dispute resolution. 
3.  A Cooperative Legal System 
How could things like a collaborative attitude, a common goal, a commitment to work 
together, and trust be built into the legal system? Could the legal system de-emphasize 
the idea that a dispute can only be solved distributively? Let us speculate about these 
issues for a few more moments. Governments and courts may be able to stimulate 
people to think in terms of some common objective or goal: a neighborhood or a 
working environment where living or working is optimal for all people, for instance; 
or a goal of solving conflicts optimally and fairly.
  188 With respect to faith in one’s 
problem-solving ability, legal and other institutions can have an ‘I know you can do 
it’ attitude, and may offer assistance to the parties instead of taking the problem from 
their hands. Likewise, these institutions can support a belief in the validity of one’s 
own  position  and  the  other’s  perspective,  a  healthy,  active  self-interest  and 
recognition that parties are in a collaborative relationship. Moreover, the legal system 
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can contribute by not offering a right/wrong or win/lose perspective on issues that can 
more productively be framed otherwise.   
Most  importantly,  the  rules  of  the  legal  system  and  the  courts  can  strengthen 
motivation  and  commitment  to  work  together  by  systematically  rewarding  such 
behavior  and  discouraging  one-sided  steps.  The  law  of  civil  procedure  could,  in 
theory, be recast into a system where every next step that substantially affects the 
other  party  should  be  taken  in  cooperation  between  the  parties,  with  third  party 
assistance if the parties fail to agree. Clear goals of the dispute resolution process, 
such  as  recognition  of  interests,  maximum  value  creation  and  fair  distribution  in 
accordance with accepted legal criteria could steer the process. Secondary goals like 
efficiency with respect to dispute resolution costs in relation to error costs could help 
as well. Situations in which the cooperation breaks down, in cases where there is a 
serious suspicion of fraud, for instance, should probably become the exception, rather 
than the rule.  
Finally, we could try to move towards a dispute resolution system that inspires trust.
189 
Trust, rather than fear, we might add. When people do not trust each other, they will 
not accept information at face value but look for hidden or even deceptive meanings. 
The factors that contribute to or endanger the building of trust are manifold.
190 People 
are  more  likely  to  trust  someone  who  has  a  positive  attitude  toward  them,  who 
depends on them, who initiates cooperative, trusting behavior, which serves as an 
invitation to act likewise, and who makes concessions in a commitment to his or her 
own needs as well as to working toward a joint solution.
191 Institutions dealing with 
dispute resolution could be designed to stimulate trust by rewarding and protecting 
such behavior and reliance on it. They might even sanction parties who try to take 
advantage of those who are trusting, and especially those who give information about 
their worries and fears in order to find better solutions, only to find the other party 
trying to capitalize on these weaknesses. 
Such a program to promote cooperation might go some way into the direction of 
reinterpretation of autonomy, a basic pillar of the system of private law. The principle 
of autonomy resides in the basic choice an individual party always has between a 
cooperative solution and an alternative like another deal or a decision by a court in a 
dispute. Talking about autonomy with respect to the processes of creating a deal, or 
finding a solution for a dispute is confusing, and maybe even misleading. Moreover, 
stressing autonomy easily generates an attitude in the parties that is at odds with many 
of  the  ingredients  of  a  negotiation  environment  that  make  problem-solving  more 
likely to work. 
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IV.  DISCUSSION  
A.  Most Important Results 
Problem-solving is a negotiation method that describes in concrete terms how people 
can  optimally  cooperate.  Optimal  cooperation  could  be  turned  into  a  goal,  and 
problem-solving as a more concrete benchmark for evaluation of the legal system.  
The two main questions explored in this paper are whether such cooperation is a 
valuable goal and how it can be put into action in contract law, tort law, and the law 
regarding resolution of disputes. 
Part II of the article deals with the first question. We saw that supporting problem-
solving negotiations is likely to create value in terms of the preferences of the parties. 
It may reduce the costs of dispute resolution and probably also those of transacting, at 
least for more complex situations. It is too early to say how it interferes with other 
goals  of  private  law, such  as  prevention and  distribution  (compensation),  but this 
initial investigation yields no clear indications that having cooperation in the problem-
solving manner as an additional goal would endanger those objectives. In particular 
this goal seems to be consistent with the perspective of welfare economics, in which 
the well-being of individuals is the criterion for normative evaluation. This is not 
surprising because the concept of interests used in the problem-solving method is very 
close to the concept of preferences used in welfare economics.   
The amount of extra value created and costs saved, as well as the possible adverse 
effects on the other goals of private law, will depend on how the goal of supporting 
problem-solving is implemented and on the effects of these measures on the actual 
conduct  of  negotiating  parties.  Part  III  discussed  seven  possible  areas  of 
implementation, inferred from five basic elements of the problem-solving method, 
and supplemented by two issues where problem-solving and the values embedded in 
the legal system seem to clash. The road to change that transpired has many known 
stretches that can be joined in a coherent perspective by the objective of cooperation 
in the problem-solving way. An example is the need to improve access to court arising 
from the aspiration to reduce bargaining ranges in order to make value distribution 
easier and to diminish the influence of bargaining power. Another such insight is that 
the rule systems of contract law, tort law, and civil procedure neglect the processes of 
negotiating contracts and disputes.  
Other elements are more novel. The problem-solving method, stressing the use of 
objective criteria, also invites us to redesign the rules of substantive private law in 
such a manner that they optimally help the negotiating parties whilst they search for 
satisfactory outcomes. Better criteria for distributive issues are presumably two sided, 
have a continuous character instead of an all-or-nothing one, and avoid an evaluation 
of the past conduct of the parties. Negotiation theory suggests that it is not necessary 
to have an exclusive rule, giving one right answer, for distributive issues, because it 
can be left to the parties, and eventually to the court, to compare the outcomes under 
several different objective criteria and find a decision that fits the pattern. Likewise, 
criteria do not have to be binding, but can be adjustable to individual differences in 
valuation  of  interests,  different  ways  of  creating  value,  and  dissimilar  external 
circumstances. The perspective of problem-solving also invites us to rethink the role 
of blaming and of the principle of autonomy.    60 
B.  Possible Limits of Usefulness: Pure Enforcement and Fraudulent Conduct  
The  usefulness  of  problem-solving  theory  in  evaluating  and  improving  the  legal 
system also has its limits, although it is as yet unclear where exactly they are located. 
That the method has been less successful in situations where the distributive issues are 
prevailing, like in personal injury cases, where the parties often use the method and 
tactics of purely distributive bargaining, is a fact, but probably not a natural limit. This 
might have to do with the kind of objective criteria tort law has to offer and with the 
extreme  size  of  the  bargaining  range,  which  lures  parties  into  trying  to  grab  the 
biggest part of it and thus induces them to be cautious or even to strike preemptively 
instead of being cooperative, open and trust-inspiring.  
The real limits may lie in the important areas of private law, where the traditional goal 
of prevention should be predominant. Private law should also help people to enforce 
unambiguous obligations. People who do not pay their bills should be forced to do so. 
In cases where fraud is suspected, the problem-solving method has also little to offer. 
In this area, we certainly need to know more about the interference between the goals 
of prevention and problem-solving.  
C.  Possibilities for Further Research  
What more could be expected for different areas of private law if evaluation of legal 
rules in terms of the problem-solving method were a program for further research? 
Here are some possible directions this research could take.  
1.  Contract Law 
Contract law now provides the parties with tools to define their obligations and, if 
necessary, to enforce them. Some of its rules also support open communication about 
interests and a cooperative attitude. The doctrines of contract law could be rethought 
along the lines of problem-solving negotiations. Instead of just imposing duties to 
inform on one party, contract law could offer the parties guidelines for organizing 
their negotiation process in such a manner that information is exchanged in a fruitful 
manner.  
More in general, the legal system could form a primarily facilitating attitude towards 
contracting  and  other  transactions.  The  processes  of  negotiating  transactions,  the 
performance  of  such  transactions,  the  adjustment  of  contracts  in  the  course  of  a 
relationship, and the termination thereof could be facilitated. The doctrine of remedies 
for non-performance, to give another more concrete example, is now based on one of 
the parties, mostly the creditor, choosing a remedy within some restraints that protect 
the other party against substantial harm to its interests. In a legal environment that 
supports problem-solving, the parties would probably be stimulated to communicate 
about the situation of non-performance and to negotiate the best solution in relation to 
their respective interests. Contract law can contain rules that guide the parties through 
this negotiation process.  
Further research should also reveal how legal institutions supporting cooperation in 
the  problem-solving  manner  can  at  the  same  time,  or  through  different  channels, 
provide sufficient enforcement of contractual obligations. This is one of the busiest   61 
areas of Law and Economics research and this research is already increasingly linked 
to  Negotiation  Theory.  The  main  challenge  will  be  to  find  new  approaches  for 
situations  where  the  cooperation  between  the  parties  broke  down.  The  traditional 
approach,  in  which  the  obligations  of  the  parties  under  the  contracts  are  first 
determined and then enforced, may not always be the optimal one.      
2.  Tort Law 
If  the  system  of  tort  law  were  systematically  evaluated  against  the  objective  of 
problem-solving, one of the possible outcomes is that a more open mind would be 
warranted  toward  substantive  interests  other  than  monetary  ones,  as  well  as  to 
procedural  interests.  People  experiencing  serious  adverse  outcomes  have  needs, 
wishes, and fears that can sometimes be addressed directly, and often without much 
cost to the other party.  
Tort law can also be adjusted in order to stimulate the process of problem-solving 
when disputes arise. In tort law, though, value creation is less important, so that the 
bigger gains of adopting this approach may be expected where it contributes to more 
appropriate  distribution  against  lower  transaction  costs.  Providing  good  access  to 
court and to sufficiently informative objective criteria of the kind that is helpful in 
negotiations may have to become priorities. A major challenge is to find approaches 
in which blame for not living up to rules of conduct is less central. The complications 
associated with attribution of blame may provide new input for legislators that have to 
choose  between  fault  liability,  strict  liability,  or  other  more  novel  methods  of 
prevention and risk allocation.   
3.  Rules Regarding Dispute Resolution 
Pre-trial dispute resolution can also be organized in a manner that supports problem-
solving. Courts and the practices of lawyers influence the conduct of disputants before 
they bring their disputes to court. The same goes for procedures set up by corporations 
and other organizations for dealing with complaints and other common sources of 
disputes. These procedures can be tested on their compatibility with problem-solving 
and adjusted if necessary. 
A very interesting perspective is the one of letting courts adopt the problem-solving 
approach, at least for some types of disputes. The picture that then emerges is that 
courts – judges, possibly even jury-like entities, or whoever is entrusted with neutral 
and state-backed dispute resolution – would first facilitate negotiations following this 
method. If necessary, they could also decide disputes in the problem-solving manner; 
mostly by providing evaluations of the distributive issues that separate the parties 
using suitable objective criteria, but if necessary also by imposing other elements of a 
solution  that  optimally  serves  the  underlying  interests  of  the  parties.  By  letting 
adjudication become problem-solving, the system would also change the shadow that 
hangs  over  negotiations  about  disputes,  and,  thus,  the  basic  game  of  these 
negotiations. Problem-solving courts could be a powerful example for the parties that 
may come to court, so that they start to problem-solve long before they end up before 
this court. 
Another issue that did not get much attention in this article is how much fact-finding 
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efficient prevention. Many jurisdictions, the Anglo-Saxon ones in particular, give the 
parties  access  to  extensive  fact-finding  procedures.  Could  fact-finding,  where 
necessary, also become a cooperative process? And in which situations should a party 
have  access  to  more  extensive  fact-finding  procedures,  for  instance  because  it 
suspects fraud?  
4.  Problem-Solving Lawyers?  
A final issue is the role of lawyers in a system that has a more prominent place for the 
problem-solving  method.  The  tension  between  principals  and  agents  is  the  third 
tension negotiators have to manage
192 and it has not been discussed in this study. Many 
lawyers already use problem-solving skills. If the legal system gradually increased its 
support for problem-solving negotiations, the legal profession would probably change 
more fundamentally.
193  
The  incentives  on  lawyers  in  a  problem-solving  legal  environment  have  to  be 
explored, however. The Law and Economics research on settlement usually models 
positional bargaining as this takes place in a more traditional legal setting.
194 Studies 
that include agents and take into account the complexity of cooperation are rare.
195 One 
of the issues that deserve more attention is the incentive under a contingency fee 
arrangement to strive for monetary compensation and not for other types of solutions, 
because it is difficult to measure the value to the client of an element like an apology.      
D.  Conclusion 
Most people will not immediately associate the legal system with cooperation. They 
mainly see law as an enforcement tool for situations in which cooperation did not 
work. The legal system, however, is also the institutional framework that supports 
contractual  relations  and  dispute  resolution.  We  live  in  a  society  where  every 
individual has its own unique preferences and where relations with others are almost 
always necessary to realize those preferences. Under these circumstances, contracts 
and differences between people often lead to the best results in terms of value created 
and transaction costs, if the parties cooperate. 
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The  problem-solving  method can  be  seen as  a  model  of  optimal  cooperation  that 
includes the choice individuals must make between advancing their interests through 
cooperation with another person or through pursuing an alternative strategy (a batna). 
Comparing  this  model  with  the  legal  system  as  it  exists  now,  leads  to  many 
suggestions for improvement. If successfully implemented, these innovations hold the 
promise  of  extra  value  to  be  created  and  lower  costs  of  transacting  and  dispute 
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